

DIALOGUES

ON SOME

IMPORTANT SUBJECTS,

DRAWN UP

After the Manner of SOCRATES.

DIALOGUES

ON SOME

IMPORTANT SUBJECTS

DRAWN UP

After the manner of SOCRATES

DIALOGUES

ON SOME

Important Subjects,

DRAWN UP

After the Manner of SOCRATES,

For the Use of

HIS SERENE HIGHNESS

The PRINCE of SAXE-GOTHA, *K*

By Mr. VERNET, *(J. J.)*

Professor in HISTORY and BELLES LETTRES
at GENEVA.

LONDON,

Printed for A. MILLAR, in the Strand.

MDCC LIII.

26



3 Hc

THE
* TRANSLATOR'S
P R E F A C E.

THE affected obscurity, that many writers have introduced into their method of treating those subjects, which are of the highest importance, and of the most general use, has been detrimental to the progress of solid science, and often defeated its best purposes. When truth is perplexed and clouded with a multitude of *puzzling terms; imaginary distinctions, and laboured discussions*, it loses

* The Rev. Mr. A. MACLAINE,
Minister of the English Church at the Hague.

that perspicuity that enlightens the understanding, and that noble simplicity that touches the heart. This is particularly the case with respect to *moral* truths, which are deduced from the most *simple principles*, and founded on the most *obvious relations*. It would make a sober man laugh to see Philosophers ransacking the whole *Ideal* world, and combining the forces of *Metaphysics*, and even *Algebra*, to prove that we should serve God and love our Neighbour. Abstract reasonings have indeed their place; they are often necessary, and even sublime; but they are very improperly applied to *moral* truths, which must be deduced from observation and experience, referred to inward principles and
feel-

feelings, and illustrated by familiar and striking images founded upon the *analogy* of things.

The wisdom of SOCRATES, in his method of arriving at moral truth, held forth a model that was worthy of the imitation of all sober inquirers. He had the wonderful and masterly art of making the most ignorant arise to knowledge, by proposing to them simple questions, that developped their ideas, unfolded their sentiments, and made them thus pronounce, themselves, the very truths which he designed to teach them. He enriched the mind with treasures drawn from itself, and it may with justice be said of him, that he drew even from the

lms A 4 mouths

mouths of *babes* the sublimest wisdom. The loftiest tree is contained, in miniature, in a small seed, and only grows and expands itself by being properly cultivated; in the same manner, the most vulgar minds contain the latent *seeds* of the richest knowledge, which, when drawn forth by culture, springs up apace; but where this culture is wanting, these *principles* of knowledge escape even the *consciousness* of such as possess them, and the ignorance of the mind arises from its inactivity. Never was there a man who knew, like SOCRATES, how to cherish and unfold these latent *seeds*. With a gentle and skilful hand he set them in motion; he made them *vegetate, bud, blossom*, and by an easy
and

and natural gradation drew from them the fairest and the most delicious *fruits*. His questions, beginning upon self-evident principles, arose to clear and immediate consequences, that led the mind insensibly to the noblest discoveries. It was thus that truth arose in its native beauty, and in its full power, and, without perplexing the understanding, captivated and charmed the heart.

The learned and ingenious Author of the following Dialogues (whose merit is far above the praises of such an obscure pen as mine) has imitated, with dignity, the *Socratic* method. It is true that this *method* will only succeed in the hands of such, as, like

him, are masters of the subjects on which they write. To unfold with *plainness, perspicuity, and ease*, truths which require penetration and nice discernment, is only the privilege of those who know them intimately, and are perfectly and familiarly acquainted with them. A superficial knowledge of truth will always produce *obscurity* in those that attempt to write; at least, it will yield nothing that is solid and satisfactory; and it is impossible for an author to avoid perplexity in his *expressions* while he wants clearness and perspicuity in his *ideas*.

The subjects, that are handled in these Dialogues, are of the highest impor-

importance, and contain a collection of the wisest rules for the direction of mankind in their various relations whether *religious, civil, or social*. The author indeed, by introducing SOCRATES as the principal person, was obliged to confine himself to Natural Religion in the dialogue that has religion for its subject; but he has, even there, ingeniously displayed the excellence and the advantages of *Revelation*, by the confession of those defects which attend the light of Nature, and the earnest desire and expectation of a farther discovery of the Divine will, which he puts in the mouth of this great Philosopher. And, that this *confession*, and *expectation* are not falsely, or by way of fiction,

attributed to SOCRATES, may be seen in the *note* upon that passage. In a word, those Dialogues, tho' designed principally for the instruction of an *Illustrious Prince*, are yet of such a nature, as renders them every way adapted to the advancement of useful knowledge, and substantial virtue, in every station and condition of life.

The Reader will see, by the title that is prefixed to this work, that it was designed for the use of the Hereditary Prince of SAXE-GOTHA, from which *Illustrious House* the *British* Nation derives one of its brightest Ornaments in the person of a ROYAL PRINCESS, whose virtues add lustre to her exalted rank, and whose hope-

hopeful *Off-spring* will repair a loss, which, otherwise, we could never sufficiently deplore. The editor of these Dialogues has informed us particularly of the occasion on which they were wrote, and as he mentions in this account some things that relate to the method, that was used in the education of the Prince for whom they were drawn up, it may not be improper to insert it here. I therefore give it in his own words, which are as follows.

These Dialogues were composed at Geneva, by Mr. VERNET, professor in History and Belles Lettres, for the instruction of his Serene Highness the
be-

hereditary Prince of Saxe-Gotha; and they were drawn up at the time that the Prince, in the study of antient History, had proceeded as far as the life of Socrates.

There were two things that the author had here principally in view. The first was, to set before the Prince some examples that might shew him the manner in which Socrates instructed by familiar conversations, taking occasion from every incident, that offered, to raise the mind gradually to useful and important reflections. The second was to make use, at the same time, of these very examples to instruct his Highness in a variety of moral subjects.

The

The principal speakers in these dialogues are SOCRATES, and EVAGORAS, prince of Salamis in the isle of Cyprus, who is supposed to have gone young to Athens, to pursue his studies.

This first dialogue, and those that follow, will shew the manner, in which the prince is taught History. In ancient history every thing is improved to moral purposes. Instead of loading his memory with proper names, facts of little consequence, or useless dates, it is proposed to set before him a connected series of the principal and most important events. There is a particular attention bestowed on the lives of illustrious men, the portrait of whose characters
are

are drawn to the prince, after which he is left to decide their merit, to approve, or blame this or that action, giving, at the same time, the reasons on which his decision is founded. This manner of proceeding is equally adapted to form his judgment and to improve his heart. Examples instruct more powerfully than precepts, because they are more striking, make deeper impressions on the memory, and are also more amusing.

When the prince shall have gone through a course of ancient history after this method, he is to apply himself to modern history in the same manner, only with this difference, that as then he will be farther advanced in age, and
will

P R E F A C E. xvii

will have presented to his view events that are more closely connected with the present times, it will, here, be necessary to direct his studies to political, as well as moral improvement. By all this, he will not only learn what sort of examples it is necessary to imitate in order to arrive at true virtue, and perceive the blessings that a religious prince draws down upon his person, but will also be instructed in the different forms of government, in the means that are adapted to render a state flourishing, and happy, in the various methods that are required for this purpose in different states according to their different constitution, and policy. He will observe also here the faults that many princes are chargeable with, in the

admi-

administration of their government, and how different has been the fate of such Sovereigns as were the darlings of their people, from that of those unhappy Princes who were the objects of their hatred. In a word, History is presented to this Prince as a tablature that conveys the most useful instruction; and the design of those who are entrusted with his education, is to form in his heart those principles, that will render him capable of appearing with dignity in the amiable characters of the honest man, the christian, the son, the friend, the husband, the father, and the sovereign.

ADVER-

ADVERTISEMENT.

IT is proper to inform the Public of the uncommon liberty I have used in the translation of these dialogues. I have too often perceived the gross inconveniences of translations merely literal, not to be convinced that this liberty is justifiable, and that it will neither be displeasing to the Author, nor useless to the Reader. When the *french idioms*, and manner of diction, are forced into *English*, the delicacy of the thought is often lost, and the *genuineness* of our language is always corrupted. To avoid these defects, I have in some places rather
com-

ADVERTISEMENT.

composed in the taste of my Author, than translated him literally. Every language has its peculiar manner of expression, and every translator, who desires to give his work the easy *air* of an original, should follow the thought of his Author only, unless it be in those cases, where his expressions are capable of being literally rendered, and that with elegance. These cases happen sometimes, but not frequently.

I have taken yet a greater liberty. I have pursued, and (as it were) extended some thoughts, that are expressed with much brevity in the original, that I might thus render them more affecting to such whose *penetration*

ADVERTISEMENT.

tion and *delicacy of feeling* might not be so great, as *those* of the Illustrious Person for whom they were wrote. This may, perhaps, require an apology to the Author, but it needs none to the public. I have, however, done this but seldom, and with much caution; and not with any view to correct a Writer, whom I consider as a model in point of erudition, genius, and style.

The faults that have escaped my own eye, will be readily observed by those who look *into* this translation with less partiality. Such, however, will treat them with indulgence, when they know, that my only design in this little work is to contribute
to

ADVERTISEMENT.

to the formation of *Youth*, by presenting to the tender mind, in an obvious and amiable point of view, those *truths* and those *principles* which alone can render *man reasonable*, and *happy*.

*Nunc adhibe puro
Pectore verba, puer: nunc te melioribus offer.
Quo semel est imbuta recens, servabit odorem
Testa diu.*



CONTENTS.

DIALOGUE I.

*Concerning the Duties that relate to
Man in general, and those that in
particular constitute the true character of
a Prince.* 1

DIALOGUE II.

*Concerning the conduct that is to be observed
towards Inferiors.* 25

DIALOGUE III.

*Concerning the necessity of raising our
thoughts to the Supreme Being, and the
pleasure which arises from this noble ex-
ercise of our reasonable faculties.* 69

DIALOGUE IV.

Concerning Dissimulation. 117

DIALOGUE

CONTENTS.

DIALOGUE V.

*Concerning a frivolous disposition, or a zeal
for trifles.* 141

DIALOGUE VI.

*Concerning the value we should set upon the
esteem and approbation of men.* 171



DIALOGUE I.

CONCERNING

The Duties that relate to MAN
in general, and those that in
particular constitute the true
character of a PRINCE.

SOCRATES and EVAGORAS.

SOCRATES.

MAY I ask you, Evagoras, what
you were yesterday looking at
with such attention and ear-
nestness, in those spacious walks, that
lead to the Pyræum?

EVAGORAS.

You were there also, I find, Socrates;
I am sorry not to have known that: I
should have made no difficulty to leave
what I was looking at, for the pleasure
of your company.

B

SOCRATES.

2 DIALOGUE. I.

SOCRATES.

This I take as an obliging instance of your politeness and friendship: But, pray tell me, what you would have left on my account?

EVAGORAS.

Why really the preference is no great compliment; for I was only looking at a Peacock.

SOCRATES.

A Peacock! that is the most beautiful bird in the world, and I cannot help thinking myself much obliged to you for so readily giving me the preference.

EVAGORAS.

'Tis true, there is nothing more beautiful than the figure of that charming bird: There is something noble and majestic in its air and motions: The lively green that paints its feathers, is agreeably diversified with various shades: Its neck is clouded with a bluish dye, that is perpetually changing
ing

ing, each step it makes, and when exposed to the sun, presents to our sight a beautiful succession of azure and purple colours, that seem blended with gold: its head is adorned with a plume or crest, that surpasses the lustre of the Persian Diadem, and then its tail, studded, as the fable says, with the eyes of Argus, when it is spread out, and expanded in all its glory, is incomparably more gorgeous than the richest brocade.

SOCRATES.

I am charmed with your description, Evagoras, and should indeed be surprized at it, did I not consider how early you began to enrich, by the reading of our best Poets, that uncommon genius, which you derive from Nature.—But while you dwell with rapture on the beauties of the Peacock, you say not a word of its singing.

B 2

EVA-

EVAGORAS.

O! as to its music, Socrates, let us pass it in silence; it is far from being of a piece with the rest of the description: you know what a vile squeaking cry it makes, that grates even those ears, whose feeling is the least delicate.

SOCRATES.

You see, Evagoras, that all perfections seldom or never are found in the same object: — Nature has blended shades of imperfection in her fairest productions, and has so disposed her gifts, that they in some measure counterbalance one another. — I find then you are disgusted at the music of the Peacock; perhaps, you would like a Swan better!

EVAGORAS.

Doubtless, if we may depend upon what the poets say of its melody. I have been often struck with the rich and lively white that shines in the plumage of that noble bird, nor have I less admired
that

that air of dignity and ease, with which it sails along the stream; but I never had the pleasure to hear it sing.

S O C R A T E S.

It is not in this only, that the imaginations of the poets have transported them beyond the bounds of reason and truth. I find however that you would give the preference to a bird that could sing; is it not so?

E V A G O R A S.

Without comparison: for though it is natural to be struck with a fine figure, and a rich plumage, yet, I must own, one tires soon of this, when there is nothing farther to attract the attention: you see in a little time all that is to be seen, and a quarter of an hour will satiate your curiosity; besides, if the Peacock is fool enough to open his beak, this is sufficient to chase away the spectator. But, Socrates, I have a Canary-bird at home . . .

B 3

S O C R A -

6 DIALOGUE I.

SOCRATES.

You are much more amused with this, I suppose.

EVAGORAS.

O much more: you yourself would be delighted if you heard it: 'tis a charming little creature. Such sweet notes! such warbling! such undulating strains! such agreeable airs, and in such an endless variety, that in reality the pleasure is new every day.

SOCRATES.

All this naturally leads me to ask you some questions, that arise from the very subject we have been speaking of: tell me then, my dear Evagoras, if you saw a man of a noble mien, set out in a rich dress, and a splendid equipage, would this satisfy you?

EVAGORAS.

No surely: for, like the peacock, he might still conceal something, which would abundantly counterbalance all this finery.

DIALOGUE I. 7

finery. To form a judgment of the merit of such a person I must hear him speak.

SOCRATES.

You mean by this, I suppose, that if his conversation discovered, under this splendid figure, a character made up of ignorance, vanity, perfidy, and indiscretion, that you would not be imposed upon by his pompousequipage, or his Phrygian embroideries?

EVAGORAS.

Such things are only fit to dazzle fools; but in reality such a person is good for nothing; and I should look upon it as a dismal lot, were I under a necessity of passing my life with him.

SOCRATES.

Since then your attention is so little engaged by the splendor of an outward appearance, what is it, that, you think, would administer solid pleasure, and have power to command your approbation and esteem?

B. 4

EVA-

8 DIALOGUE I.

E V A G O R A S.

That, Socrates, which I find in you. You have nothing of that outward elegance in your figure, or in your dress, that flatters so much the vanity of numbers, and makes them imagine they have a right to the public esteem; and you are so little concerned about such things, that you are the first to joke upon the frugality, or rather parsimony with which Nature has set out your person.—And yet, destitute as you are, of all these external recommendations, your company is sought after by every one, not only as the object of their choice, but even of their ambition. You speak with such knowledge, and in such an agreeable manner on every subject, that whole days spent in your conversation pass unperceived, while the tedious presence of the best dressed Spark with an empty head, and a shallow judgment, is not supportable even for an hour. What a difference

D I A L O G U E I. 9

rence is there here! excuse the comparison, dear Socrates, it is just like the Peacock and the Canary-bird.

S O C R A T E S.

Your comparison is just, and therefore needs no apology; besides, in the manner you apply it, I take it as a compliment. But may I be so free as to tell you, that you are not quite consistent with yourself?

E V A G O R A S.

This is but too possible: my levity may have betrayed me into some inconsistency; but it is my happiness, Socrates, that you are here to redress my error: what then is the contradiction with which you accuse me?

S O C R A T E S.

When we met here, the first thing you did was to launch out into the praise of the Peacock, and to describe his beauty with an enthusiastic sort of admiration: and the moment after, you load with re-

B 5 proach

proach and contempt such men as resemble him. Is this holding the balance even? Is this giving impartial judgment? Should you not rather praise such persons, in so far as they resemble the beauties of this gaudy bird; though at the same time you might justly reproach them, as destitute of the superior graces of knowledge, and the charms of conversation?

EVAGORAS.

Nay, Socrates, surely here I am not mistaken. What! do you think that the qualities, that I admire in a bird, render a Man worthy of praise, and that a reasonable creature can be honoured by the encomiums that are lavished upon an animal? In my opinion, man should stand distinguish'd by a merit of a quite different kind.

SOCRATES.

And by what kind of merit, Evagoras?

EVA-

DIALOGUE I. II

EVAGORAS.

By that kind that is suitable to the nature of Man.

SOCRATES.

Let us hear an example of this, Evagoras. Is swiftness in the race, or dexterity in hunting, essential to that kind of merit, which you speak of?

EVAGORAS.

No certainly: many of the inferior creatures surpass man here: we shall never be able to run with the Stag, or to hunt with the Hawk.

SOCRATES.

What think you of a vigorous and skilful Wrestler like Milo, who makes so much noise at present?

EVAGORAS.

These are exercises to which many attach a certain sort of merit, but methinks—

SOCRATES.

Methinks! what! don't you admire the prowess of a man who can carry an Ox on his shoulders?

EVAGORAS.

Might I venture to say it, Socrates, I think there is no great difference, in such a case, between the burthen and him that bears it.

SOCRATES.

You judge rightly : and you are of opinion, I perceive, that the praise of Man should be derived from qualities superior to these, even from the qualities of his mind. What think you then of an Astronomer, or a Poet? don't you look upon such as persons of merit?

EVAGORAS.

Let me think a little, Socrates; there is something plausible in this—but I dare not yet decide:—if I am not mistaken, the character of a worthy man comprehends somewhat more than this.

SOCRATES.

Do you mean, that there are qualities more essential to the character of a man of merit, than these?

EVA-

DIALOGUE I. 13

EVAGORAS.

Yes surely: for there are many worthy men, who are neither astronomers, nor poets; and on the other hand, there are many astronomers and poets, who are far from being worthy men.

SOCRATES.

There must then be some qualities more essential, than these, to the character of Man, and it must be our business at present to find them out. Now the way to this is very plain; we have only to enquire what those things are, that man cannot dispense with the want of: do you think, for example, that a Man can be without the faculty of *reasoning*?

EVAGORAS.

By no means: for in whatever pursuits, or actions we may be employed, we will always find it, not only advantageous, but likewise necessary, to reason justly: every kind of application requires
this:

14 D I A L O G U E I.

this: and indeed without Reason, we should be in no degree superior to the brutes.

S O C R A T E S.

But tell me, is it possible to reason well, if we are entirely destitute of knowledge?

E V A G O R A S.

No certainly, for by an ignorance of the subjects on which we reason, we must be inevitably led into perpetual mistakes. Have I not often heard you say, that to reason, is to compare ideas? but how is it possible to compare ideas, if we are not furnished with a sufficient number?

S O C R A T E S.

Your opinion then is, that the proper exercise of reason requires a certain degree of knowledge?

E V A G O R A S.

Without doubt, for an architect might as well think to build without stones,
and

D I A L O G U E I. 15

and timber, as reason could pretend to form judgments without the materials that knowledge administers, and the ideas that are furnished by observation and experience.

S O C R A T E S.

Thus far then, Evagoras, the matter is clear, and we are perfectly agreed; but we are not yet arrived to the point in view: for let us suppose a person furnished with the knowledge of various things, and perfectly qualified to reason upon them with justness and perspicuity, but at the same time void of all principles of religion and virtue; would you look upon such a one as a man of merit?

E V A G O R A S.

On the contrary, Socrates, I should think him doubly worthy of contempt, as in such a case he must both oppose and pervert his reason, by not employing it in the regulation of his affections and in the improvement of his mind.

S O C R A T E S.

16 DIALOGUE I.

S O C R A T E S.

You are of opinion then, that *piety*, and *justice*, *benevolence*, and *temperance*, are qualities essential to *man*, and that without them the character of humanity is incomplete?

E V A G O R A S.

Without doubt: for what an unnatural spectacle is man, when characterised by impiety, and violence, licentiousness and arrogance? What perplexity and remorse must he create to himself? What misery and disorder will he not produce in the world? Can he ever be the object of esteem or love, from any of his fellow-creatures? Must he not, on the contrary, be abhorred by gods and men?

S O C R A T E S.

I am delighted to hear you speak with such warmth on this subject: this shews a noble and generous heart, that glows with a lively sense of the excellence and
dignity

dignity of virtue. But permit me to lead you a little farther. We have found that *just reasoning, a certain degree of knowledge, virtuous habits, and good dispositions, are qualities essential to Man, without which he must be both highly contemptible, and unhappy.* But do you imagine that a *Painter*, for example, should satisfy himself with the qualifications we have been here laying down?

EVAGORAS.

I think that since he has attached himself to this particular profession, he should endeavour to excel in it.

SOCRATES.

Your opinion then is, that *beside that kind of merit, that is essential to the character of man in general, and with the want of which no man can dispense, there is moreover a particular kind of merit, that is required as suitable to the rank and station of each individual, and to the profession or calling that they have embraced.*

EVA-

38 DIALOGUE I.

EVAGORAS.

You have perfectly explained my meaning, Socrates, and it is not without reason that they say of you, that you help people to think.

SOCRATES.

To form then a judgment of the merit of any person, what questions would you put to him, and where would you think it proper to bound your inquiry? Would nothing more be necessary than to inform yourself of his probity and understanding? Or would it not also be expedient to examine whether he had the qualifications that belong to his profession and occupation in life?

EVAGORAS.

I think indeed that these two things should never be separated; so that after informing myself of the knowledge, judgment, and integrity of those, whose character and merit I wanted to know, I would inquire farther how they discharged

ed the more peculiar duties of their respective stations: Is such a Captain brave? Is such a Philosopher learned? Is such an Orator eloquent? Is such a Father or Mother assiduous in fulfilling, with tenderness, the parental relations? By such questions as these, when the occasion presented itself, I think, I should come to the knowledge of that *merit* of which we have been speaking.

S O C R A T E S.

This, Evagoras, is judging well, and I am glad to see that you so perfectly apprehend the matter now before us. But, prithee tell me, what do you think of the condition of a PRINCE? is not this also a rank in life that indispensably requires certain qualifications?

E V A G O R A S.

Undoubtedly it does: the obligation more peculiarly incumbent on a Prince, is, to govern well.

S O C R A -

SOCRATES.

This is true : but what do you understand by governing well ?

EVAGORAS.

Governing in such a manner, as to shed abroad the sweets of peace and happiness throughout his People.

SOCRATES.

But what must a Prince do in order to the accomplishment of this noble end ?

EVAGORAS.

He must enact good laws, and give them an additional force and majesty in his example : he must make them to be respected by the punishment of guilt, the protection of innocence, and the encouragement they afford to merit and virtue : he must endeavour to render his subjects religious, sober, industrious, and pacific ; resolute notwithstanding to defend their liberties and maintain their rights with valour, against the inroads of tyrants, and usurpers ; he must
make

make the arts and sciences flourish in his dominions, maintain the public order, and, as far as his observation can extend, must have an eye upon the various ranks that compose the State, that he may see how each discharge the duties of their respective conditions.

S O C R A T E S.

It is not possible, Evagoras, to explain better, than you have now done, the duties and obligations that are incumbent on Princes. Such wise sentiments, at such a tender age, as yours, while they excite my admiration, must at the same time give me the most pleasing hopes of your future progress in noble attainments.—You don't think then, that a Prince should rest satisfied with the acquisition of an ordinary kind of merit?

E V A G O R A S.

An ordinary merit is suitable to an ordinary station; but I am persuaded that

that a Prince should look higher than this; having so great a task to fulfill, he should endeavour to excell others in virtue and knowledge as far, as he surpasses them in rank and dignity.

SOCRATES.

Remember, O Evagoras, the great truths you have been now pronouncing, and let the solemn impressions of them never be effaced in your heart.—But do you think, that in order to the attainment of these noble qualities, there is nothing farther requisite than to place them in your view, with an intention and desire to be possessed of them?

EVAGORAS.

I think indeed, Socrates, that a good deal depends upon this; and I have heard you say, that desiring any thing earnestly goes a great way towards the attainment of it; and the reason is, I suppose, that such desire excites our activity and zeal in pursuing the means that are proper

per to accomplish the end we have in view : but I am, however, very sensible that with the greatest ardour, and the best intentions, man may frequently fail for want of capacity and skill. Here lies the difficulty : and that I may question you in my turn, tell me, Socrates, how this skill is to be acquired ?

S O C R A T E S.

It is to be acquired by the instructions of able masters, when they are received with docility and attention. There is much assistance to be derived also from a judicious choice of books, which are indeed a rich and abundant source of wisdom and knowledge. But what I would have you chiefly observe here, is, that there is nothing more proper to form the judgment, and to improve the heart, than good examples, good conversation, and good company. This is a kind of instruction, which constantly, tho' imperceptibly, insinuating itself into our hearts

24 DIALOGUE I:

hearts, and producing insensibly inward habits, seldom fails to produce its effect. This article, however, would lead us too far, were we to enter upon it at present; besides, I perceive that the hour obliges you to retire.

E V A G O R A S.

It is now, Socrates, that I find myself under a necessity of making an apology for my comparing you with the Canary-bird: I had then in view only the pleasure of your conversation, but now I see that every thing in it is useful and instructive.

The end of the first Dialogue.



DIALOGUE II.

Concerning the conduct that
is to be observed towards
Inferiors.

PROTHYMUS, SOCRATES,
EVAGORAS.

PROTHYMUS.

HOW lucky is it, Socrates, that
we have the pleasure of meet-
ing with you at this time? You
could never come more seasonably: we
have been disputing upon a point of some
importance, and who more proper, than
you, to decide the matter?

SOCRATES.

What! two intimate friends, and not
of one mind?

EVAGORAS.

Not always: friends are not surely
less friends because they may happen

C

some-

26 D I A L O G U E II.

sometimes to think differently; nay, I should imagine that if ever difference of sentiments can be advantageous, it is particularly so among friends; for while diversity of opinion tends to the improvement of knowledge, friendship enables men to suffer contradiction.

S O C R A T E S.

This is well said, Evagoras. Your observation is admirable, and if such wise maxims prevailed more generally in the world, the difference in opinion, that is unavoidable among men, would not be attended with that hatred and animosity, that are a reproach to humanity. But, tell me, what was the subject of your dispute?

P R O T H Y M U S.

We were speaking of the conduct that should be observed towards *Inferiors*: Evagoras alledges that we should not treat them with any sort of familiarity; and, for my part, I am quite of the contrary

DIALOGUE II. 27

trary opinion. Pray, Socrates, who is in the right ?

SOCRATES.

A little patience : a judge does not determine so quickly ; we must first have a true state of the question, and then hear the arguments on both sides. Pray, what do you mean by *Inferiors* ?

EVAGORAS.

There are inferiors of several kinds ; for example, in a family, the children are subject to their parents, and the servants to their masters ; and in a school, the disciples are subject to their teachers. In a Court, the Ministers and great Officers of State depend on the Prince, and a multitude of subalterns are dependent one upon another. In the Army, the Soldier is below the Captain, as the Captain himself is in subordination to the General. In a word, those who are obliged to obey, in whatever post or station it may be, are *inferior* to those whose privilege it is to command.

C 2

SOCRA-

28 DIALOGUE II.

SOCRATES.

And does it not also happen, that those who are superiors with respect to some, may be inferiors with respect to others ?

EVAGORAS.

This happens always: the Captain who obeys the General, commands the foldier ; and indeed this is the case in every condition of life : there is scarcely any man, who has not some below him, and others above him ; and who, in consequence of different relations, is not, at the same time, both superior, and subordinate.

SOCRATES.

You state the matter justly, Evagoras : *Superior* and *Inferior* are only qualities relative to the higher or lower rank of those, with whom we appear in comparison ; and we may observe farther, that even with respect to the same rank, there are Inferiors of different kinds, and

in

in various degrees. But do you imagine that those distinctions of rank, which we now speak of, are so constituted by *Nature*; and that, if by any accident an illustrious Noble, and a poor common Sailor were cast away together upon a desert Island, the former could claim any authority to command the latter?

E V A G O R A S.

Really, in such a case, I am afraid that Nobility would make but an awkward figure, and that the advantage would lie on the sailor's side. The hardy mariner, laborious, and dexterous in providing for the necessities of such a sad condition, would be much less out of countenance, than the poor Lord, who with all his titles would make but a wretched appearance, and scarcely know what to do with himself.

C 3

S O C R A -

30 D I A L O G U E II.

S O C R A T E S.

What is it then, Evagoras, that gives to one man the advantage over another in a *State of Nature*?

E V A G O R A S.

Independent of the pre-eminence and authority that Nature has given to parents over their children, there is, I think, no superiority that can be acquired over others in this simple state, but in consequence of bodily vigor, knowledge, and penetration, or eminent virtue; it is by these, that men can only be distinguished in such a state, because it is by these that they render themselves useful and necessary to the community. But these however, properly speaking, do not give them a title to authority and command.

P R O T H Y M U S.

I thank you, Socrates, for having led him, by degrees, to acknowledge for once the *natural equality of Men*; for it is upon this principle that I support my
opinion

DIALOGUE II. 31

opinion in the present matter. Pray, Evagoras, be so good as not to forget this.

EVAGORAS.

You need not fear; I am however persuaded that Socrates has yet something to say upon this subject, which I entreat you not to forget, Prothymus.

SOCRATES.

You think so, Evagoras? let us see if you have guess'd well.—Prothymus must then answer me some questions, as it is proper that each should have his turn.—Do you imagine, Prothymus, that men could have lived long in that state of natural equality of which we have been speaking?

PROTHYMUS.

This, I must confess, would be difficult; for it does not seem possible that society can subsist, unless there be some that command, while others obey; it is also necessary that employments should

be conferred on different persons, according to the diversity of their genius and talents ; and I see plainly that this unavoidably leads to subordination and inequality.

S O C R A T E S.

You apprehend the matter perfectly, Prothymus, and have entered well into the true causes of that subordination, and distinction of rank, that we see established in the world.—This is, however, a point that deserves to be farther illustrated.—Tell me then, is a nation any thing else, than a collection of families, that compose one of a vast size ?

P R O T H Y M U S.

I look upon it indeed in no other light.

S O C R A T E S.

And in a family is there not a certain subordination established ; and are there not certain distinctions, that characterise its different branches ?

P R O-

PROTHYMUS.

Undoubtedly: the children are under the inspection and government of their father; and besides, even among the children of the same parents there is a certain precedence, by which the elder are distinguished from the younger.

SOCRATES.

If then, Prothymus, the Athenian people may be considered as a great and numerous family, do you not think it necessary that there should be certain fathers or chiefs, to inspect and govern this large community?

PROTHYMUS.

Affuredly, Socrates, it is absolutely necessary that some persons of eminent wisdom and virtue should be clothed with authority, to watch over, and promote the public good; for surely the inconstant and many-headed multitude would never be able to govern themselves.

34 D I A L O G U E II.

S O C R A T E S.

And do you think that in time of war every man should be left to act according to his humour and inclination, or his particular views of things?

P R O T H Y M U S.

No certainly: this would introduce the utmost confusion, and must also end in weakness and ruin. It is only union in counsel, and union in execution, that can give force and vigor, with victory and success, to the most numerous armies. And it is for this reason that each troop has its leader, and that both troops and leaders are subordinate to one, who commands in chief, that so one will and one direction may at once set in motion all the various parts of this complicated Whole, and make them all work towards the same end.

S O C R A T E S.

I would ask you farther, if you imagine that it would be really of advantage

tage to society, if every one embraced the profession of all sorts of arts and callings at the same time ?

EVAGORAS.

I cannot help laughing at this question, Socrates: what a ridiculous contrast would it make, to see each citizen filling at the same time the post of Carpenter, Weaver, Doctor, Statesman, and the other employments that are necessary in a society ?—Besides, the man that grasps at all, will be perfectly sure to succeed in none. There is no genius, there are no talents so universal, as to render any one capable of filling with dignity many different stations at the same time. And I have often heard you say, that this is not only a consequence of human infirmity, but also of the wise appointment of Providence, that every one should be instrumental in contributing to the public good. It is therefore fitting that each one should confine

his views to one employment ; and then surely things will go much better for the community.

SOCRATES.

But there is yet another question, to which I would gladly have your answer. Are the various wants of society the only cause that leads men to a diversity of professions? or does nature also point out this by the different talents, which it has bestowed on different persons?

PROTHYMUS.

Hold! Evagoras, it is my turn to answer. I think, Socrates, that nature points out in the plainest manner this diversity of professions, by the diversity of geniuses, inclinations, and talents, that she has shed upon men from the riches of her wisdom. One is fit for this employment, another for that. Some have a turn for the pursuit of science, others for the exercise of the mechanic arts. There is none, as Evagoras just
now

now observed, whose genius is sufficiently universal to succeed equally in every profession; and I add, that there is not any, who, if he wisely consults his capacity, may not succeed in some.

SOCRATES.

But now, Prothymus, if in talents, and in the employments to which they lead, there is such a diversity; does not this, of itself, naturally produce a certain distinction among men, and form unavoidably different degrees of honour and credit in the various occupations of life?

PROTHYMUS.

It is true, those who are only capable of filling employments that administer to wants which are low and common, and have little in their executions that is not easy even to the meanest capacities, such, I imagine, will necessarily attract a smaller degree of distinction and respect, than those, whose genius rises to
objects

38 DIALOGUE III

objects that are great and noble, and forms designs that are, at the same time, difficult and interesting. I need not go far for examples of this: Is not Socrates the great Philosopher, Socrates the wise and experienced Senator, a much more honourable and illustrious personage, than the taylor who made him that wretched cloak?

S O C R A T E S.

Let my poor cloak alone: it is good enough for a philosopher; if it does not secure me against your jokes, Prothymus, yet it defends me against the inclemency of the weather; and this is the end, for which I wear it. But, banter apart, let me yet ask you another question relative to the subject before us;—you know, that this is my method of arriving at truth.

E V A G O R A S.

To whom, Socrates, do you address this question? it certainly should be to me,

me, were it for no other reason, than to shew the resentment that is due to the indiscretion of this witty Spark.

S O C R A T E S.

I am not at all revengeful, Evagoras, and it is to convince Prothymus of this, that I continue to address my discourse to him. We have been speaking of the distinctions that arise from different talents, and different pursuits; but tell me, Prothymus, do you think that the Rich have not also some advantage over others?

P R O T H Y M U S.

They have, at least, the satisfaction of being able to do much more good, than those who are in less opulent, or narrow circumstances.

S O C R A T E S.

No doubt: but does not their wealth entitle them also to a higher degree of respect, than others, less opulent, can have a right to pretend to?

P R O-

PROTHYMUS.

This, Socrates, is a question, which puzzles me a good deal: for while, on the one hand, I consider riches in themselves, I cannot see that they give a man the least title to distinction or esteem; and yet, in fact, they seem to be an easy and natural path to credit and reputation in the world. And indeed it must be acknowledged, that riches are adapted to give a man weight and influence, as they enable him to contribute to the well-being of numbers, as well by employing them in his service, as by extending to them the effects of his liberality; as they exempt him from the necessity of a constant application to the means of subsisting, and afford of consequence an happy leisure for the improvement of his mind, and the employment of his labours in the service of the Public. Add to all this, that a rich man can serve his Country by his wealth,

as

as an ingenious man does by his talents, and can give to his children such an education, as in elegance of taste, and useful knowledge shall distinguish them vastly from the common people. So that in all these points of view the rich man certainly has considerable advantages ; and it must be owned that fortune produces, at least in process of time, certain distinctions of honour and rank, by the effects that thus immediately arise from it.

EVAGORAS.

I grow impatient to know the end that Socrates aims at in all these questions.

SOCRATES.

This, Evagoras, you will see presently : I only wait till Prothymus has told me his opinion about the utility of these distinctions, that are acknowledged and established in civil society. Let him first pronounce whether this diversity of rank and station, of which we have been
con-

considering the principal sources, be, in itself, a bad thing, and ought to be entirely abolished; and then you will see the use I will make of the questions I have proposed.

PROTHYMUS.

I don't imagine it possible, nor indeed do I think it would be reasonable, to banish these distinctions out of the world. They seem to result necessarily from the very nature of things, and man certainly receives abundant compensation for the loss of his *natural equality*, by the advantages he derives from living under the wise institutions of *Civil Society*.

SOCRATES.

You grant, then, that there is a lawful subordination among men, which it is both wise, and necessary to maintain?

EVAGORAS.

I see now, Socrates, where your questions point. And this is the very thing that I was maintaining in our dispute,
that

that our conduct towards inferiors should be entirely regulated by that subordination that is necessary in civil society. A superior must support his dignity, and not permit his inferiors to be wanting in that respect which is his due. Did not I tell you this, Prothymus?

PROTHYMUS.

But pray, Evagoras, why do you forget what Socrates said, in the beginning of our conversation, concerning the natural equality of men?

EVAGORAS.

This equality does not subsist, since we live under the regulations of civil society.

SOCRATES.

Not so fast, Evagoras: you are too quick in your decisions: to judge aright in this important matter you must carefully attend to this solemn truth, that *human institutions may modify the laws of Nature, but can never abolish, or entirely efface*

efface them. The dictates of nature are of a general kind ; the wisdom of man may accommodate them to the various circumstances of life, but their foundations are unchangeable, and their obligations eternal. Evagoras, Evagoras, as long as mankind are formed out of the same dust, and live upon the produce of the same earth ; as long as there reigns among them such a perfect conformity, such sameness of nature, sameness of wants, sameness of infirmities, and sameness of reason ; so long will they continue to be the very same rank, and species of beings : one man will always find in another his likeness, his fellow-creature ; and the meanest slave will be entitled to reclaim from the highest Monarch the rights of that *humanity*, which they enjoy in common, and partake of equally.

E V A-

EVAGORAS.

Methinks, Socrates, there is some contradiction between the two principles you have been now maintaining. You take it for granted that there still subsists a sort of *natural equality* among men, and, at the same time you insist upon the necessity of *subordination*. Pray how do you reconcile these together?

SOCRATES.

You shall see immediately. But in order to this we must first be agreed about a third principle, which relates to the demands of *friendship*. Let Prothymus therefore tell us, in what manner he conducts himself towards his friends?

PROTHYMUS.

You should rather put this question to Evagoras. For my part, I treat them without ceremony. I give myself entirely up to them. I communicate to them my most secret thoughts. I apply to them for wise direction, and advice.

46 DIALOGUE II.

vice. I am deeply interested in whatever concerns them, and enjoy a high delight in their conversation, and society.

EVAGORAS.

Prothymus represents the matter as it really is; and such indeed is the nature of that familiarity and friendship that subsists between us. We speak upon all kinds of subjects with the utmost freedom; we communicate to each other our pleasures, our pains, every thing, in a word, even to our very secrets.

SOCRATES.

This is well: but do you unbofom yourself, in the same frank and open manner, to all, with whom you converse, and are you disposed to form those intimate connexions of familiarity and mutual confidence with every one you meet, and without any distinction?—

PRO-

PROTHYMUS.

No surely: I observe here a great difference.

SOCRATES.

And pray now, where would be the inconveniency of conversing equally, and forming connexions indiscriminately with all sorts of persons?

PROTHYMUS.

A very great one certainly: since the conversation of all sorts of persons is not equally agreeable. I am as much tired and disgusted with some, as I am pleased and delighted with others.

SOCRATES.

Is it then nothing more than pleasure, and entertainment that you propose to yourself, in the connexions you form, and in the conversations you frequent?

PROTHYMUS.

I own, Socrates, I spoke inconsiderately, and I am obliged to you for this question, which brings me to a sense of
my

my error. I should have said, that there are persons in whose conversation there is no real improvement to be acquired. And indeed the case is not only so, but there are many, with whom familiarity is even dangerous and pernicious, tending to pervert our judgments, by giving us false notions of things; to corrupt our minds, by nourishing in us evil dispositions; and even to hurt our interest, by abusing the confidence we repose in them. There is nothing more dangerous than bad company; and as our friends compose that circle of company that we frequent most, there is nothing more necessary than to be cautious and prudent in the choice of them, and to make such our friends, whose discourse and whose examples may improve the judgment, and form the heart.

S O C R A T E S.

What you have now been saying, Prothymus, is in itself of the utmost importance,

ance, it has also an immediate relation to the point in view, and you shall see the use that I will make of it. In the mean time I desire that you may not lose sight of the *principles*, concerning which you are both agreed. *There is among mankind an equality established by nature, which can never be totally effaced.* This is the first point: we have also granted, that *there is a certain subordination, that results naturally from the different talents and capacities of men, and that is both just and necessary in Civil Society.* Our business then, at present, is, to reconcile these *two* seemingly jarring principles, and to add to them a *third*, even that of which we have been just now speaking, *that it is of the highest importance to be extremely cautious and delicate in the choice of friends.* It is by uniting these three principles, that we will find a method of ending the controversy that is between you, and of deciding the matter to your

D

mutual

mutual satisfaction. And indeed this union is most natural and easy, seeing there is no sort of inconsistency, not the least discord between the principles mentioned above, as will evidently appear in the progress of those questions and observations that it will be proper to make in pursuing this subject. And here, in the first place, you will readily grant, that, in forming a circle of friends, our choice should not fall upon those, who have been ill educated, and whose conversation can be in no wise advantageous, or improving.

PROTHYMUS.

Certainly it should not.

SOCRATES.

This however is the case with such, as descend to a low and unrestrained familiarity with servants, and persons of the meaner kind. The conversation of such is not only void of all instruction, and incapable of administering the least improve-

improvement, but has also an unhappy tendency to corrupt the taste and to degrade the judgment of young people, by filling their minds with false ideas, by crushing the generous efforts of nature, and enslaving it to groveling notions, to little, to narrow, and confined views, and to vulgar and gross habits, that have no tincture of elegance or virtue. Error, credulity, envy, calumny, insipid flattery, or scurrilous and licentious raillery, such are the infectious qualities that are to be derived from mean and low connexions: and as it is most natural to contract a resemblance of those, whom we intimately converse with, in taste and in dispositions, I leave you to judge, whether, or no, such conversations as those above-mentioned will tend to improve our understandings or ennoble our hearts. And what renders such connexions more particularly dangerous, is, that they remove that

52. D I A L O G U E II.

restraint which modesty imposes upon Youth in the company of superiors, or of persons whose characters command respect. Before such as are below us, we are less afraid to expose our weakness, or our vices: we dread not their censure, and by that means derive nothing from their presence that is not rather adapted to encourage us in our errors, than to prevent or correct them. Arrogance, idleness, caprice, intemperance, every thing will go down with such as a low and vile interest engages to a compliance with our humours and inclinations. Add to all this, that bad company has a fatal influence in destroying a relish for those superior connexions, that are honourable and virtuous; and unexperienced youth, that is naturally averse to opposition and restraint, finds itself more at ease amidst those servile creatures, that applaud its follies, than in the society of such whose virtue

and

DIALOGUE II. 53

and sincerity render them less complaisant.

EVAGORAS.

Indeed, Socrates, such as admit their domestics into the intimacy you mention, do not deserve to have any other friends. I have heard it frequently observed, that such ill-judged familiarity seldom fails to render our servants our masters; so that whosoever is so mean, as to descend to such familiarity, will not fail to find himself governed by those, whose influence he encourages by an ill-placed condescension.

SOCRATES.

True, Evagoras: such persons as know the weak side of their masters, as are attentive to their humours and complaisant to their passions, if they are entrusted with their secrets, and admitted to that intimacy which (by their abuse of it) inspires presumption, this will lead them to assume authority by degrees.

D 3

and

and will in the conclusion put their masters in their power. Slavish in their compliance, they are employed for convenience; and, conscious of secrets that often will not bear the light, they are feared by masters, whom they have ceased to respect, and govern in a station where they should only obey. This is the misfortune of many Princes, who hear negligently, and only for the form, the advice of their Counsellors and Ministers; while they are drawn away by the base and selfish suggestions of low creatures, who are the slaves of their caprice, and the instruments of their pleasures.

PROTHYMUS.

What then is the right method of treating domestics, and in what manner should we live with them?

EVAGORAS.

We should live with them as with persons that resemble us by the participation

cipation of the same nature, but who at the same time are subordinate to us in consequence of the order established in society; as with persons who are destined to be our servants, and not our counsellors. So that we must guard against every thing in our conduct towards them, that looks like contempt, disdain, arrogance, or ill-humour. No injurious language, no indecent anger, no unjust severity. Remember, Prothymus; that they are men, and that humanity, in whatever station it may be placed, has always a just and unquestionable title to our benevolence, and affection. Let our language then to them, while it is addressed with authority, be tempered with gentleness. Let them be the objects of our care, and of our good offices, and let us correct their failings with clemency and moderation. Rage and invectives degrade and debase the person that employs them.

56 D I A L O G U E II.

Hear what they have to say, and speak to them with mildness, concerning those things that belong to their station and service; but farther than this no conversation or familiarity, no jesting or raillery. In a word, let them find in you a good master, but not an intimate, or a companion. While you preserve this middle way between inhuman arrogance, and degrading familiarity, you will be the object of their love, and at the same time of their respect, especially if you follow another direction that I cannot help adding upon this occasion.

E V A G O R A S.

And what is that Socrates? I am curious to hear it.

S O C R A T E S.

It is plainly this; that the orders we give should never proceed from mere humour or caprice. Authority alone may indeed force an inferior to obedience, but such obedience is performed
with

with reluctance; it becomes a yoke instead of a pleasure, and is neither animated by zeal, nor attended with respect. The great master, to whose government and authority every one seems willingly to submit, is Reason. Let a command imposed be ever so difficult, it is executed with pleasure when it is found to be necessary and just: but if a superior discovers, in the orders he gives, a whimsical inconstancy of temper, if he commands thro' fancy, and is neither directed by wisdom, nor prudence in the exercise of his authority, his service will justly be considered as unequitable, and severe, and his superiority will only serve to render him contemptible. He that desires to be well served, must take care to command wisely; and in order to have our authority respected, we must begin first by respecting, ourselves, the authority of reason.

58 DIALOGUE II.

EVAGORAS.

These indeed, Socrates, are most excellent rules, and they may, I think, be easily applied to the conduct we should observe towards inferiors of every kind. I acknowledge, on the one hand, that we should treat them with mildness, while it is but just, on the other, to claim their submission and obedience, agreeable to these two admirable maxims, 1st, That we should consider them as partakers of the same nature, which we derive from the hand of one common parent. And 2dly, That we should maintain that subordination that is necessary in civil society.

SOCRATES.

Right, Evagoras: but you must also remember, that as even among those that bear the general character of Inferiors there are various orders and different ranks; in a word, as all are not inferiors in the same degree, they must
not

not all be treated in the same manner, but must be distinguished by different degrees of attention and regard, in proportion as they are more or less subordinate in their different stations. Some faint mark of condescension and benevolence is not sufficient towards many, that may be called inferiors; there are numbers in that class, who have a right to higher tokens of esteem, and who really deserve more conspicuous proofs of affection and regard.

E V A G O R A S.

Tell me then, I entreat you, what is the proportion that is to be observed in this matter, and how to adjust the different degrees of affection and esteem, that are to be exercised here? A Prince, I am sensible, has inferiors of various kinds: he has Ministers, Counsellors, Officers, and Courtiers of different orders, and subjects that fill all the various stations and conditions of life. How then must

60 D I A L O G U E II.

he conduct himself with respect to all these ?

S O C R A T E S.

Let us begin with the common people. And here I observe, that the Prince is obliged to shew, towards the meanest of his subjects, the ordinary marks of condescension and civility, and while he guards against whatever might carry the appearance of arrogance and disdain, he should also seek occasions of exerting that compassion and humanity which are the brightest ornaments of princely grandeur, and by placing acts of beneficence with propriety and discernment draw forth from the united voice of the public this glorious testimony, that he is a good Prince and loves his people.

E V A G O R A S.

This, I am persuaded, is the duty of the Prince towards the body of the people. But I am impatient to learn the

DIALOGUE II. 61

the conduct that he must observe with respect to those of a superior rank.

S O C R A T E S.

The nobility, and those who fill such employments in the state as are rendered honourable by being important, are to be treated with higher marks of distinction: the Prince must proportion his attention and regard to the dignity, the age, and merit of these, his more illustrious subjects. In the exercise of his condescension here it is always much better to exceed, than to be wanting in the least point, because it is a matter of the utmost consequence to a Prince, that persons of this order be satisfied with his government, and find something engaging in his conduct and manner; it is of the highest importance that such persons find their situation at his court agreeable and alluring; that they attach themselves with pleasure to his service, and be ready to embrace
with

with ardour every opportunity of promoting his glory, and advancing his interests. On this really depend the pleasure of his life, the grandeur of his reputation, and the success of his affairs; and therefore he can scarcely exceed in those acts of generosity and condescension that have a tendency to procure such useful attachments.

EVAGORAS.

But while you shew the duties incumbent upon the Prince towards the different orders of his subjects, that you have now mentioned, you seem to reserve little for his more immediate and particular friends.

SOCRATES.

You are merry, Evagoras.—A Prince, —does he stand in need of friends? a fine story indeed! no, no, let him amuse himself with his grandeur, and be contented with the respect that is paid him, and the titles that he is loaded with by
sub-

DIALOGUE II. 63

submissive crowds. Friendship is only fit for little mortals, who creep in the obscurity of private life.

EVAGORAS.

What! you banish Friendship then from Courts? what have poor Princes deserved at your hand, that you thus rob them of the chief comfort which cheers the life of man?

SOCRATES.

I don't think, Evagoras, that I injure them grievously in this matter, since they themselves are rarely sensible of this comfort. They are much better pleased with servile complaisance, than with the noble freedom of sincerity and truth. It is flatterers that they seek for, and not friends.

EVAGORAS.

This, it must be owned, is too often the case; but suppose, for once, a Prince susceptible of the charms of friendship, how must he conduct himself
with

64 D I A L O G U E II.

with respect to those whom he chuses for his friends ?

S O C R A T E S.

This, Evagoras, is not such an easy matter, as it requires the sacrifice of a very delicate point, the total sacrifice of that pride, that is the offspring of superiority, and the parent of arrogance. A Prince who would become a friend, must descend from his grandeur when he acts in that character: in the commerce of friendship he must forget that he is a Prince, and this he may do without losing his dignity, for those to whom he appears as a friend will always remember that he is a Prince, nor will his condescension diminish their respect. It is certain, that an unreserved frankness is the basis of friendship, and that where there is not a reciprocal and equal freedom of thinking without restraint, and of speaking what we think, that amiable commerce cannot subsist.

Upon

D I A L O G U E II. 65

Upon these conditions you may acquire friends; upon any other, you will have only servants.

E V A G O R A S.

I don't see the difficulty, which you seem to imagine, in establishing that ease and freedom of commerce, that is essential to friendship. On the contrary, I should think that nothing could be more agreeable to a Prince, than to step aside, at certain seasons, from that tedious round of ceremony and constraint which attends their elevation, to enjoy the sweets of freedom and ease in social life. It is familiar converse that repairs the fatigues of grandeur, and affords the softest and most delightful recreation amidst the cares and labours of a princely condition.

S O C R A T E S.

This is certainly true, Evagoras, and those Princes who are the most jealous of the honours and respect that their
station

station demands, are sensible of it, and feel it in the languor that loads their spirits under the weight of their grandeur and a perpetual repetition of the same ceremonies. But what is the consequence? why, they run from one extreme to another, and seek their recreation, not in a decent condescension to the delightful commerce of the Wise and Good, but in the conversation of domestics, comedians, and buffoons; which eclipses their dignity, and debases their grandeur. Weak minds act seldom by a just measure. They soar, and creep by turns, and know not the middle way that leads between the towering heights of arrogance, and the groveling level of a mean familiarity.

E V A G O R A S.

What then, Socrates, is that middle way that is necessary to be observed here?

S O C R A T E S.

A Prince that would follow this uncommon

common path, must chuse amidst his court, or in the country where he reigns, a certain number of persons the most remarkable for their merit and virtue, their prudence and knowledge, the lustre of their example, and the elegance of their demeanour; and with such may he pass both usefully and agreeably the hours that he sets apart for amusement and conversation. In this society, every thing relating to manners and behaviour should be the same that is observed in what we call polite company in private life, where persons are independent, where they assemble through inclination, and are united by esteem. The Prince here must behave precisely like a man of quality among his friends. He must require nothing on account of his rank. He must suffer contradiction; he must shew towards others that attention and politeness which he expects from them; and endeavour
to

68 DIALOGUE II.

to render himself agreeable by those manners, that please him in others. And now you have seen how a Prince should conduct himself with respect to men of all orders, and act the different parts that are consigned to him on the theatre of life, with dignity, and with ease.

EVAGORAS.

I now see plainly, that Prothymus and I went both too far. It is the natural defect of youth, like ours, to fall into extremes, and it is equally natural for the wisdom of Socrates to point out with perspicuity the middle way.

The end of the Second Dialogue.



I
rem
and
shou
it as

DIALOGUE III.

CONCERNING

The necessity of raising our thoughts to the Supreme Being, and the pleasure which arises from this noble exercise of our reasonable faculties.

SOCRATES and EVAGORAS.

SOCRATES.

WHAT are you reading, Evagoras, with so much attention?

EVAGORAS.

I am reading the narration of a very remarkable and uncommon adventure; and I am really at a loss whether I should consider it as an history, or treat it as a fable.

SOCRA-

70 DIALOGUE III.

SOCRATES.

How has it fallen into your hands?

EVAGORAS.

I found it here as I was walking, where in all probability some one has dropt it out of his pocket. I have been carefully perusing it, but I don't as yet apprehend what it means. Shall I read it to you, Socrates? and may I, at the same time, take the liberty to ask your opinion of it?

SOCRATES.

I consent readily to what you demand. But first, let us retire a little out of the common road. I see a place just fit for our purpose under the spacious shade of that beautiful tree. Let us remove thither. Now begin Evagoras.

EVAGORAS *Reads.*

“ A certain young man, whose name
“ was PHILOTHEUS, was brought up in
“ a city of Epirus, without knowing
“ who

DIALOGUE III. 71

“ who were his parents. His curiosity,
 “ which increased as he advanced in
 “ age, led him to discover, after many
 “ enquiries, that he had been acciden-
 “ tally cast upon that coast with a nurse,
 “ who was since dead : that his father,
 “ whose name was URANIUS, was of an
 “ illustrious rank, but none knew from
 “ whence he came, nor if he was yet
 “ living. The persons, from whom he
 “ had these informations, gave him a
 “ bracelet of gold, on which was en-
 “ graven the name of URANIUS, with
 “ these two words : *Think and Search.*
 “ As this imperfect discovery only serv-
 “ ed to add new warmth to the desire
 “ he had of finding out his origin, he
 “ set out secretly, one evening, in com-
 “ pany with EUPHRON, and embarked
 “ in a vessel belonging to Corcyra, which
 “ brought him directly to Corinth. Af-
 “ ter having made many fruitless en-
 “ quiries there, he resolved to pass thro’
 “ all

72 DIALOGUE III.

“ all the cities, and maritime towns of
 “ Greece. A whole year was spent in
 “ this manner, when arriving at Phocis,
 “ he immediately consulted the oracle of
 “ Delphos, and was told that he should
 “ find what he was seeking in a coun-
 “ try where all the inhabitants were
 “ brethren. This answer was too ge-
 “ neral to give him the information he
 “ wanted; he therefore continued his
 “ enquiries; passed again the Ægean
 “ Sea, pursued his journey along the
 “ coasts of Asia, but in vain; for he
 “ neither found his father URANIUS,
 “ nor the amiable *Fraternity*, of which
 “ the Oracle had told him. On the
 “ contrary he saw, wherever he passed,
 “ divisions and animosities reign-
 “ among men, thro’ the fatal influence
 “ of self-love and ambition: he saw
 “ malice and envy embittering their
 “ society and rendering them pernici-
 “ ous and destructive to each other:
 How

“ How different, said he with an heavy
 “ sigh, are these unfriendly scenes from
 “ that peaceful region of which I am
 “ in pursuit!—To leave nothing un-
 “ tried, he resolved to return once more
 “ into Thrace, where some sacred re-
 “ mains of the laws, and instructions
 “ of the wise Orpheus had survived the
 “ ruins of time. In order to this, he
 “ went on board a ship that was bound
 “ for the Bosphorus; but scarcely had
 “ they approached the streights, when
 “ a violent south-wind drove them
 “ back from the shore, and carried
 “ them into the Euxine Sea. There,
 “ tossed to and fro by the raging tem-
 “ pest, their vessel struck, at length, up-
 “ on a bank of sand, near the mouth
 “ of the Danube, and was dashed in
 “ pieces. While in these distressing
 “ circumstances every one was intent
 “ upon the means of escaping, our two
 “ Travellers were particularly fortu-

E

“ nate.

“ nate. They seized on a plank and
 “ some provisions, and committing
 “ themselves to the mercy of the waves,
 “ were cast, in five or six hours, upon
 “ a beautiful coast. They here offered
 “ up thanksgiving to the Gods for
 “ their deliverance, and after having
 “ dried their garments at the heat of
 “ the sun, the first thing that they were
 “ solicitous to discover, was, whether
 “ the country was inhabited. There
 “ appeared certain traces of culture in
 “ the fields, that, together with some
 “ paths cut through the woods, rendered it highly probable that it was;
 “ but EUPHRON maintained that these
 “ marks proved nothing; since all they
 “ had seen might be the effect of
 “ chance, or arise from the sport, and
 “ caprice of Nature. Let us advance
 “ then a little farther, said PHILO-
 “ THEUS;—but what do I see? Tri-
 “ angles, and geometrical figures de-
 “ lineated

“ lineated on the sand ! These, surely,
 “ you will acknowledge, without hesita-
 “ tion, to be the work of man. I grant
 “ it, replied EUPHRON, and my doubts
 “ vanish ; for besides those figures, I
 “ perceive other marks of human in-
 “ dustry in those cultivated plains that
 “ lie before us on the left hand, and
 “ those shady forests, that are pierced
 “ through with walks and vistas on
 “ the right. Observe those rising hills
 “ covered with vines, whose spreading
 “ branches are supported by rows of
 “ stately elms ; those meadows also
 “ in the distant vale watered by streams,
 “ which the hand of art has certainly
 “ conducted through their verdant pa-
 “ stures, and that orchard that rises
 “ beyond the meadows, not inferior in
 “ beauty to those of Alcinous.—Every
 “ thing around us seems to proclaim
 “ the efforts of industry, and the sweets
 “ of abundance ; but I have not, as

76 D I A L O G U E III.

“ yet, observed a house in all this lovely scene. Advance a little farther, replied PHILOTHEUS, and you will perceive, through those trees, several cottages, in the midst of which is placed an antient building, that looks like a Temple. There is something grand in the aspect of this edifice, that strikes notwithstanding its plainness and simplicity.

“ While they were thus engaged in discourse, they perceived a company of Shepherds that advanced towards them, singing a Hymn, and dancing to its numbers, with gracefulness and proportion. Their heads were crowned with chaplets of flowers, and their looks expressed that chearfulness, and harmony, that are the amiable prognostics of contentment and happiness.—Tell me, said EUPHRON to one of the Shepherds, what is the name of this smiling region, where every
“ thing

“ thing breathes innocence and joy?
 “ You see, O Strangers, replied the
 “ eldest of the company, the country
 “ of Adelpia, where men live like bre-
 “ thren, and from whence Lycurgus
 “ drew the materials of his wisest laws.
 “ This is the festival of the Sovereign
 “ of this place, which we celebrate with
 “ transports of gratitude and joy, for
 “ he governs us with the tenderness of
 “ a father, and we derive from his
 “ bounty the happiness we possess.
 “ EUPHRON here asked, where this So-
 “ vereign lived, and what was his name?
 “ This building that you see, is his
 “ palace, replied the Shepherd, and
 “ his name is URANIUS. URANIUS!
 “ cried PHILOTHEUS in raptures, what
 “ do I hear? EUPHRON entreated
 “ the good old man to pursue his story,
 “ and to instruct him in the means
 “ that URANIUS employed to render
 “ them thus happy. The laws that

78 D I A L O G U E III.

“ he has establish’d, continued the Shep-
 “ herd, are simple, and plain ; they are
 “ few in number, but are founded in
 “ equity, and adapted to general use ;
 “ those who observe them, will not fail
 “ to surpass in solid wisdom the deepest
 “ Philosophers. He loves us as his
 “ children ; he is attentive to our wants,
 “ in order to supply them ; he corrects
 “ us with mildness, and moderates our
 “ passions ; he makes us feel the power,
 “ and inspires a taste for the charms, of
 “ Virtue and Reason ; hence we live in
 “ harmony and peace with each other,
 “ and he delights to see the concord
 “ that joins our hearts, and the happi-
 “ ness that it produces in our lives.
 “ All that you see in this pleasant re-
 “ gion, is the fruit of his wisdom and
 “ the work of his hand. At one view
 “ he sees all, and with the authority
 “ of a word he keeps every thing in
 “ order ; each inhabitant loves and re-
 “ spects

DIALOGUE III. 79

“pects him as a father, and he is the
 “subject of the hymn that we have
 “been now singing. But why do I
 “entertain you with an account of
 “that, which you may see yourselves?
 “nothing will so perfectly convince
 “you of the happiness of those who
 “live under his inspection, as the re-
 “ception you will meet with, when
 “admitted to his presence, altho’ ye
 “be strangers; and therefore I shall
 “now conduct you thither. I long,
 “cried PHILOTHEUS, for this happy in-
 “terview! Come, EUPHRON, let us
 “mend our pace; I have found what
 “I sought for. O my father! my
 “dear father! how great, how in-
 “expressible is my joy in coming at
 “length to the knowledge of thee, in
 “whom I shall find that satisfaction
 “and repose that have so long fled
 “from my most ardent pursuits!
 “What pleasure shall I enjoy from

80 DIALOGUE III.

“ finding at length in thee, not only
 “ the author of my life, but also a
 “ powerful protector, a tender friend,
 “ a bountiful benefactor, and an un-
 “ erring guide? Here then is my coun-
 “ try; I have, I desire no other: O
 “ happy event! O delightful mansions!
 “ What tranquillity dwells in this sweet
 “ abode! And he that reigns in it, is
 “ my father

Here Evagoras ceases to read.

S O C R A T E S,

Why do you stop short, Evagoras, in the midst of such an interesting narration?

E V A G O R A S.

I stop with regret, but the paper will
 carry us no farther; it is unluckily torn
 at this last sentence, so that we are left
 to guess at the conclusion of the story.
 As far as I can conjecture, it must have
 ended with a tender and affecting scene,
 that restores a son to the bosom of a
 father,

DIALOGUE III. 81

father, and a father to the longing desires of a son; and this discovery, no doubt, must have rendered PHILOTHEUS happy beyond expression for the rest of his days. What is your opinion of the matter?

SOCRATES.

I imagine, indeed, that the event must have been as you alledge; and if you have a desire that the story should be finished, you may, I think, very easily make the supplement yourself.

EVAGORAS.

Were it only a fiction, I could do this without difficulty; but perhaps it is the recital of a fact that has really come to pass.

SOCRATES.

Let it be fiction, or truth, that is not material. Our business here is to see if it contains any thing from whence instruction may be drawn. Were it only an allegory, it must of necessity carry in it some truth or other.

82 DIALOGUE III.

EVAGORAS.

And what truths do you perceive here, Socrates?

SOCRATES.

Let us examine a little this matter.— But tell me first, whither or no you approve the sentiments of PHILOTHEUS?

EVAGORAS.

Approve them! nothing surely is more natural than the desire of knowing our parents, and nothing more just, nothing more suitable, than the joy he discovers in finding out his father. Why, I think him, a second Telema- chus.

SOCRATES.

Your case, Evagoras, is different from his; you have had the happiness of being educated in the midst of your family.

EVAGORAS.

True, Socrates, and I am bound by the strongest ties of gratitude to thank the Gods for this inestimable blessing.

SOCRA-

SOCRATES.

You will however easily perceive that your parents are not the original authors of your existence, and that you must rise above them to a superior cause, who has formed the whole human race, and who is himself the uncreated source of every thing that thinks, lives, and moves.

EVAGORAS.

Without doubt; and the reasonings, which I have often heard you employ on this subject, have perfectly convinced me that Man is as much the work of God, as any other part of the creation.

SOCRATES.

May not, then, this first Creator of all things be properly called our Father?

EVAGORAS.

He certainly is a Father in the true, and sublime sense of that word.

SOCRATES.

What then, Evagoras, do you think

84 DIALOGUE III.

of those, who will be at no pains to come to the knowledge of this heavenly Parent?

EVAGORAS.

This, I must confess, discovers either an unaccountable stupidity, or a base and ungrateful turn of mind. PHILOTHEUS was of a quite different character.

SOCRATES.

But you, Evagoras, who are filled with a noble and rational desire of coming to the knowledge of this great Parent, where will you seek him, and where, do you imagine, is the place of his abode?

EVAGORAS.

The sovereign Intelligence cannot be confined to any place; for surely, Socrates, he that made all things, must fill all things; and I have heard you say, that the heavens and the earth are the habitation of his immensity.

SOCRATES.

DIALOGUE III. 85

SOCRATES.

We may then come to the knowledge of him without going far : that azure vault that is extended above our heads, that sun that enlightens the world, those seas, islands, mountains, and valleys, are all his work, and these are his domain. So that we see his operations, we inhabit his dwelling, and live upon his bounty. Say, Evagoras, what parent is like him, in dignity and grandeur ? This is a father worthy of the most profound veneration and respect, the true URANIUS whom we should all seek after.

EVAGORAS.

This, then, is the moral of the allegory I have been reading. I begin to imagine that he who so happily explains it, may have had a hand in composing it ; and this is not the first time that you have taken such methods to excite the curiosity of youthful minds.—That
smile

86 D I A L O G U E III.

smile, Socrates confirms me in this notion: ah! now I see very well. . . .

S O C R A T E S.

It matters not, Evagoras, from what hand this paper comes: our business is to draw from it the useful instruction it may contain.—Is it not a very high satisfaction to the mind, to be able thus to discover through the whole of nature the marks of it's great Author?

E V A G O R A S.

This must yield the same kind of pleasure, that PHILOTHEUS experienced when he found out his father.

S O C R A T E S.

In reality the knowledge of God is the noblest science that the mind can acquire. It rectifies our ideas by giving us, as it were, a key that opens the system of the universe to our view; and hence it is the great and fruitful principle that renders the researches of philosophy truly comfortable and satisfactory to the heart.

But

DIALOGUE III. 87

But these are not it's only advantages; it has many more when attentively considered.

EVAGORAS.

And what are these, Socrates?

SOCRATES.

Its greatest is to ennoble the soul, to calm our passions, and to regulate our manners.

EVAGORAS.

And how does it produce these happy effects?

SOCRATES.

Don't you think, Evagoras, that it is of unspeakable advantage in the conduct of life to have excellent models placed in our view?

EVAGORAS.

Without doubt; nothing can so strongly excite us to aspire after perfection, nor so effectually assist us in the pursuit of it.

SOCRATES.

88 D I A L O G U E III.

S O C R A T E S.

Yet when we take a view of human nature as it appears in a present state, we see it almost every where obscured with imperfection and vice.

E V A G O R A S.

This indeed is but too true.

S O C R A T E S.

But the scene changes when we raise our thoughts to the Supreme Being.

E V A G O R A S.

Surely, Socrates; for it is then that I feel my mind transported with the idea of a most pure, perfect, and exalted nature.

S O C R A T E S.

Don't you think then, that it would be noble in man, and of inexpressible advantage in the direction of his conduct, to place this venerable example in his view?

E V A G O R A S.

This indeed would be the truest heroism;

roism; but man is incapable of forming his actions after so great a model*.

S O C R A T E S.

True, Evagoras, man cannot approach a model so high; but, notwithstanding this, he should always set it before him; because by this he will always have present to his mind an idea of the *Supreme Beauty*, and *the Sovereign Good*; and there

* This objection, that Mr. Vernet puts in the mouth of the young Prince, is very natural; and indeed men are so generally incapable of fixing habitually their attention upon objects that have no sort of relation to their outward senses, that the example of a Being, purely spiritual, will too seldom attract them with force, or excite them to its imitation with warmth and vigour: and yet at the same time it is true that nothing less than an all-perfect Being can be a constant model for Intelligences whose progress will be eternal. It is here then that the wisdom of God is peculiarly admirable in the plan of Redemption, where it displays the plenitude of all moral perfection in the likeness of our nature, and consequently in a point of view every way adapted to command our attention.

are

90 DIALOGUE III.

are many cases, where this great idea may excite to noble and generous deeds.

EVAGORAS.

As how, Socrates?

SOCRATES.

Let a Prince or a Magistrate propose to himself the imitation of the Deity, must not this immediately strike him with a solemn sense of the obligation he is under to administer justice with impartiality, and disinterestedness, with equity and wisdom? such have only to put this question within themselves; how would God govern men, if with an immediate hand, and in a visible form he held the reins of civil society? and surely those who are his vicegerents upon earth should govern in the same manner, as far as their unavoidable imperfections will admit. This is a compendious, but at the same time most excellent system of morality.—Tell me, Evagoras, if you were always in the presence

DIALOGUE III. 91

fence of a man, that was rendered venerable by his wisdom and virtue, would you venture to discover any thing immoral, or even indecent in your actions, or discourse?

EVAGORAS.

No, Socrates, for I have often found by experience, how effectually your presence could check the risings of folly and passion.

SOCRATES.

If then the presence of a mortal can impose such respect, how much more should we be restrained from unlawful pursuits by the presence of that God, who never loses sight of us, even for a moment, but has his all-comprehending eye perpetually upon us? how is it possible that under a sense of the inspection of this Universal Mind, whose nature is so pure, and so averse to iniquity, the heart of man should dare to commit a crime, harbour a fraud, conceive a lye,
or

or indulge itself in dishonesty, ingratitude, or pride?

EVAGORAS.

I am struck with your solemn reflections on this subject; but is it not true, Socrates, that an habitual attention to the presence of God would keep the mind in perpetual fear and restraint? and yet, I think, you observed to me just now, that nothing was more agreeable, than to raise our thoughts towards the Supreme Being. I cannot well reconcile this.

SOCRATES.

You told me, Evagoras, in a very obliging manner, that my presence excited in you a certain respect, that laid a restraint upon your passions; but I have not, however, perceived that it ever rendered you uneasy.

SOCRATES.

Far from it, Socrates. I have ever found your company as agreeable as it is useful,

useful, and I should be extremely uneasy, were I deprived of it. By this you have made me sensible, that to be kept within bounds, by respect, gratitude, and esteem, is not only very different from servitude and constraint, but is also a bond of the most delightful kind: there are none, whom we are so much afraid of displeasing, as those whom we truly love.

S O C R A T E S.

Your observation is just, and you have perfectly hit on the point of view in which this subject should be considered. If then it is delightful to raise our thoughts to that Being who possesses all perfections, how must this delight be increased when we are permitted to approach him under the tender relation of a Father? how transporting to observe, through the whole of nature, the marks of his liberal hand, to cast ourselves on the care of his wise and good providence, and to hope that through
the

94 DIALOGUE III.

the imitation of his perfections we shall one day be exalted to the participation of his felicity? O Evagoras, what raptures does this thought inspire? What comfort does it administer amidst all the perplexities and changes of life?— You have sometimes told me, that you observed an uncommon calmness, and tranquillity in my frame and temper

E V A G O R A S.

True, Socrates, I have often admired that uninterrupted serenity, that habitual good humour, which seem to raise you to an happy independence on the events and changes of the world, and which yield an inward satisfaction and contentment, far superior to what was ever felt by those who are called men of pleasure, or favorites of fortune.

S O C R A T E S.

If it is true that I am possessed, in any degree, of this inestimable blessing, I owe it entirely to the considerations

now

now mentioned: these are my chief joy; these I look upon as my greatest treasure.

EVAGORAS.

I find myself much affected by the manner in which you speak upon this interesting subject. But there is, I think, something yet wanting to complete our satisfaction here; for we cannot see this celestial Parent, nor hear his voice.

SOCRATES.

You mistake, Evagoras: this satisfaction is by no means denied us; for since the Universal Mind is every where present, he must know our thoughts, and may also communicate his intentions to us.

EVAGORAS.

I comprehend perfectly that our most secret thoughts must be known to him; but I cannot so well conceive how we can come to the knowledge of his intentions

96 D I A L O G U E I N

tentions and designs with respect to us.

S O C R A T E S.

When you read a book, do you not imagine within yourself that the author of it speaks to you? Don't you see his sentiments? Don't you discover his views? Is there not in reality a kind of conversation between him and you?

E V A G O R A S.

This is indeed the case.

S O C R A T E S.

And what is Nature, but a great volume, in which the supreme Intelligence addresses itself to us in the most distinct characters, by the sublime, though silent language of his works*, and

* This thought of Mr. Vernet is so happily expressed in that beautiful imitation that Mr. Addison has given of the sixth Psalm, that we cannot help inserting it here at length, as it never can be placed with more propriety.

THE spacious Firmament on high,
With all the blue etherial Sky,
And spangled Heav'ns, a shining frame,
Their great Original proclaim.

the

DIALOGUE III. 97

the beauty and order they so richly display. But it is not here alone that the sovereign Being makes himself known to man : there is an inward voice

Th' unweary'd Sun from day to day
Does his Creator's Pow'r display,
And publishes to ev'ry Land
The work of an Almighty Hand.

Soon as the Ev'ning Shades prevail,
The Moon takes up the wond'rous tale,
And nightly to the lift'ning Earth
Repeats the story of her birth.

While all the Stars that round her burn,
And all the Planets, in their turn,
Confirm the tidings as they roll,
And spread the truth from pole to pole.

What tho' in solemn silence all
Move round the dark terrestrial ball ?
What tho' nor voice be heard, nor sound
Amidst their radiant orbs be found ?

In Reason's ear they all rejoice,
And utter forth a glorious voice,
For ever singing as they shine,
" The Hand that made us, is divine."

F

of

98 D I A L O G U E III.

of deity that speaks in his heart, and requires only our attention, to be heard distinctly.

E V A G O R A S.

I would be glad to have this more fully explained.

S O C R A T E S.

Have we not such clear ideas of certain truths, that we refuse to admit, nay reject, without hesitation, whatever contradicts them; and on the contrary, do we not readily acquiesce in whatever is agreeable to these ideas?

E V A G O R A S.

Without doubt: and these, I suppose, are what the Philosophers call *first principles*, which serve as the foundation of all our reasonings in the arts and sciences.

S O C R A T E S.

And again, with respect to the conduct of life: have we not here also a certain rule, and certain principles, by which

DIALOGUE III. 99

which we distinguish between good and evil, just and unjust?

EVAGORAS.

Affuredly we have: and hence, I apprehend, all the various branches of morality spring forth, as from their proper root; and it is from the observation, or neglect of this important rule, that the conscience of man rewards him with self-approbation, or stings him with remorse.

SOCRATES.

Do you think, Evagoras, that it is in our power either to change the nature of these *principles* that give us the first notions of truth, and virtue, or to efface entirely their impressions in our minds?

EVAGORAS.

I cannot think that this is possible: no efforts that I can make, will ever be able to hinder me from believing, for example, *that the Infinite Being is superior to the Finite; that ingratitude is wor-*

thy of blame ; that the greater good is to be preferred to the lesser ; that we should conduct ourselves towards others, as we would desire that they should conduct themselves towards us. These are unchangeable maxims, universally received in all times and in all places.

S O C R A T E S.

To come then to our purpose: tell me, Evagoras, from whence do we derive this intellectual power that discerns truth, and this moral instinct that leads to virtue ?

E V A G O R A S.

We derive them from ourselves, from our reasonable nature.

S O C R A T E S.

Very well : but this is not going to the source ; for who endowed us with this reasonable nature ? who has originally imprinted in our minds those unchangeable ideas, those first notions, on which all our reasonings are founded ?

E V A -

DIALOGUE III. 101

EVAGORAS.

I see where you would lead me, and perceive now clearly, that all this can only proceed from the Author of our being, the same great Mind that has disposed with such order all the parts of universal nature.

SOCRATES.

This indeed is the case, Evagoras; it is this supreme Being, who has given us this inward direction, and who speaks to us constantly in the secret admonitions of reason and conscience. This is the *good Genius*, which I have always gloried in as my director and guide, and which would equally be the guide of all men, were they disposed to consult him. Perhaps the goodness of the Divine Being will one day engage him to speak in a more open manner to the children of men, and to express in the terms of human language the dictates of his will, that their attention may be thus more powerfully excited when his solemn

voice reaches their ears†. But until that happy period arrives, let us read in the great volume of Nature which he has opened to our eyes, and attend to the secret language of our hearts, which is the faithful interpreter of his righteous will.

E V A G O R A S.

This is undoubtedly our duty ; but I can't help wishing, that this language was yet more striking, than it is.

† The language that is here put in the mouth of Socrates, is perfectly conformable to the notions he had, as we may see in two of Plato's Dialogues. In that which is entitled *Epinomis*, after having observed, that piety is the noblest object of our desires and pursuits, he adds, " but who shall be sufficient to instruct us in this, if God is not his guide ?" In that Dialogue, which is called the *Second Alcibiades*, he represents Socrates, as saying, " that in order to know what is agreeable to the Gods, the surest method is to wait until the Deity, in compassion to our infirmities, send us a teacher to instruct us in his will : " to which the Disciple adds, " the divine goodness induces me to hope, that that time is not far off. "

S O C R A -

SOCRATES.

It is sufficiently striking to an attentive mind.

EVAGORAS.

But how is this attention to be acquired? how shall we find the way to render these beautiful ideas, of which you have been speaking, habitually present, and familiar to our minds?

SOCRATES.

Attention of mind, which is a thing so necessary to facilitate our success in whatever we pursue, is only to be acquired by habits of application formed by degrees, and strengthened by continual exercise. But, particularly, in order to arrive at the full and distinct comprehension of moral and intellectual truths, it is necessary, above all things, to retire from the tumult of passions, and guard against a life of dissipation and sensuality. We must begin early to converse with ourselves, to enter deeply

into our own minds, and dwell upon those clear and distinct notices of things which reason administers; we must submit to its judgment all our feelings, and all our ideas; we must consider the order and design of things, arise to their principles, and from thence proceed to examine their ends; in a word, we must be careful in distinguishing between that which is spiritual and that which is only corporeal, between the inward reality, and the outward appearance. For example. . . .

E V A G O R A S.

Good, Socrates:—it is an example I want; these are necessary to illustrate truth, and it is by them that you have the art of rendering your instructions plain and intelligible to all capacities.

S O C R A T E S.

For example, then; suppose that you were placed in solitude, removed from all objects that affect the senses, and in
a per-

D I A L O G U E III. 105

a perfect tranquility of body and mind: perhaps you will think such a situation the least adapted to recal to your thoughts the Creator of all things. And yet, even here, without going out of yourself, or considering any thing but what passes within you, you cannot avoid observing certain inward motions in your bodily frame, and a constant succession of perceptions in your mind. Now these motions and perceptions, that are utterly independent on your will, and are produced also without the concurrence or operation of any outward agent, must naturally tend to raise your thoughts to that Being by whom you are thus constituted, and whose wisdom has thus arranged the motions both of your intellectual and bodily frame.

E V A G O R A S.

But, methinks, solitude, and particularly the silence of the night, inspire

F 5

a sort

106 D I A L O G U E III.

a sort of secret terror that renders unfit for an attention to such reflections as these.

S O C R A T E S.

I am sensible that this is generally the first effect that solitude and darkness produce in the minds of Youth. But what is there more effectual to dispel these impressions, to remove our fears, and to restore our tranquility in these moments, than this encouraging thought, that an Universal Providence watches over us, and protects us, and has so ordered all things, that nought can disturb the just subordination and the perfect harmony which he has established in the world?—

E V A G O R A S.

I feel the power of this affecting truth: certainly it is every way adapted to remove our fears; and I think the confidence it inspires is still farther strengthened by this consideration, that a grateful

ful acknowledgment of the divine bounty, and a dependance upon it, a recourse to his goodness for the pardon of our faults, and a submission of our wills to his righteous laws, will in a particular manner draw down upon us the effects of his liberality, and engage the care of his more especial Providence in our protection and defence. In these, I think, is placed the only worship that can be agreeable to the Deity, a worship infinitely more precious in his sight, than the richest hecatomb.

S O C R A T E S.

Certainly, Evagoras. God, who is a pure Intelligence, cannot be pleased with corporeal offerings, or external services, any farther than as they are expressive of inward piety, and are attended with good dispositions in the heart. So that as often as we contemplate this great Being with joy and delight, moderated by respect, we offer him a ser-

vice suitable to his nature. And I have already observed to you, that we should seek and improve every occasion of raising our thoughts to the Deity.

E V A G O R A S.

Don't you think, Socrates, that rural objects are adapted to recall God to the mind, and that in the most natural and affecting manner? When I walk abroad, or even but open my window, and see before me an extensive prospect of fertile plains, diversified with shady groves, and interspersed with numerous and crowded villages, that are marks of a wealthy and flourishing country; when I see these meadows, whose verdure is constantly refreshed by winding rivulets that send their moisture in endless meanders thro' the fruitful ground, and that distant lawn terminated by a ridge of mountains, which hide their towering summits in the clouds; I find then, Socrates, that these beauties of
Nature,

DIALOGUE III. 109

Nature, at first sight, recall to my mind the idea of their great Author.

SOCRATES.

No doubt they do: and these happily are the objects that present themselves most frequently to our view. If however we are attentive to what passes, we will find that the idea of a Deity does not less naturally offer itself to us in the hurry of the world, and in the tumult of cities, than amidst the solitude, and charms of rural scenes.

EVAGORAS.

How can that be?

SOCRATES.

When we cast our eyes upon that vast concourse of people that crowd to the public places of resort; senators that go to the Areopagus, merchants that come from Smyrna, Pelusium, and the islands of the Baleares, artists of every profession, and strangers from every country; this spectacle, which, at first sight,

110 D I A L O G U E III.

fight, offers only a prospect of human industry, will lead a thinking and attentive mind, by a natural chain of ideas and reflections, to the first cause and author of all things; it will lead us to observe that love of society, which God has planted in man; that gift of language, that is the bond of all social commerce; that variety of good things, with which he has enriched the earth; that diversity of talents, which he has bestowed upon mortals, that, standing in need of one another's assistance, they might be engaged to supply each other's wants by the mutual exchange of good offices, and the reciprocal exercise of equity and beneficence.—There are here, Evagoras, wonderful displays of divine Wisdom, and that in a rich and beautiful variety.

EVAGORAS.

These reflections are certainly extremely just, and I shall not fail to make

DIALOGUE III. 111

make use of them when such a scene, as you describe, is offered to my view.

SOCRATES.

But do you imagine that even the Courts of Princes, which appear the least proper to furnish such reflections, may not, however, naturally excite them in an attentive mind?

EVAGORAS.

I should not be surprized, Socrates, if a mind like yours (which can distinguish *truth* and *good*, wherever they may be dispersed) should find matter for such reflections even in the midst of a Court. It is then to your discerning spirit that I must have recourse to direct me in the case you have now mentioned.

SOCRATES.

Form to yourself then the notion of a day of state and ceremony at the court of a great monarch. You see the order and symmetry that reigns in the midst of all this magnificence and
pomp.

112 D I A L O G U E III.

pomp. The different ranks, that rise in an exact gradation from the lowest officer to the Prince on his throne, are distinctly marked out by the services and duties that are attached to them. Each one acts in his own sphere, fulfilling the duties that his station prescribes, and all concur, though in different ways, to answer the purposes of the present solemnity. Does not then, Evagoras, this regular disposition lead to the idea of a more perfect symmetry, and a more sublime order, that prevails in human society, and reigns through the whole of universal nature? The subordination established in a court is an image of that which is established among men, and of the limits that are prescribed to each rank and condition; limits, which neither Prince nor Subject can transgress, without breaking in upon the general order, and forming rebellion against the Sovereign of the Universe.—But
 what

DIALOGUE III. 113

what think you, Evagoras, of the circle of pleasure? shall we find here any path that may lead us to the Deity?

EVAGORAS.

I think we may: in the midst of the richest entertainment, and of the most splendid feast, I perceive something that may naturally lead to these sublime ideas. If the variety of the meats pleases my palate, and the sound of music charms my ear, if the mirth of the company raises my spirits, and produces within me agreeable sensations; I have only to ask myself, from whence these agreeable sensations come? and I immediately find that he who is the Author of all things, is also the author of my pleasures, it is his wisdom that has suited these objects to my organs and senses, and while I use them with discretion, and enjoy them with moderation, I shall find in them a variety of entertainment and delight.

SOCRA-

114 DIALOGUE III.

SOCRATES.

Thus it is, Evagoras, that even amidst the grandeur, and pleasures of the world, those who think, and reflect upon what passes, will be unavoidably led to admire the wisdom, and acknowledge the bounty of the Author of the Universe; and all pleasure is very imperfect, that is not referred to the great and original source from whence it is derived.

EVAGORAS.

In this way, then, every object will conduct us to the knowledge of our great Benefactor.

SOCRATES.

Yes, Evagoras, and of all the meditations that can employ our minds, this is the noblest, and the most fruitful of substantial comfort and satisfaction.—You seem to be fond of allegorical narrations?

EVA-

DIALOGUE III 115

EVAGORAS.

I confess, I am; and I look upon them as an agreeable exercise to the mind. I see that you are acquainted with my weak side, by your falling upon this method of drawing my attention.

SOCRATES.

The universe, Evagoras, is an allegorical picture. — Exercise then your faculties to find out its meaning, by arising in your thoughts to that sovereign Mind, who dwells within this veil that conceals his essence from mortal eyes: employ your intellectual and moral powers in discovering the designs of this heavenly Parent, who will make himself known to those that seek after him, and will be found of such as sincerely endeavour to draw near unto him. This is the Religion of the heart; this is that true, that divine Philosophy, which alone is adapted to purify our affections,
to

116 D I A L O G U E III.

to calm our anxieties, and to render man both happy and wise.

EVAGORAS.

I am thoroughly persuaded that this alone is true wisdom: THINK and SEARCH. Don't imagine, Socrates, that I shall ever forget those two words, or the useful commentary that you have made upon them.

The end of the Third Dialogue.



DIALOGUE IV.
Concerning Diffimulation.

SOCRATES, EVAGORAS.

SOCRATES.

I Suppose, Evagoras, you have been going through your exercises at the Academy?

EVAGORAS.

Yes, Socrates; you know that they usually end at this hour.

SOCRATES.

'Tis true, I saw you coming from thence yesterday about this time; but, I think, you had not such a chearful countenance, as to day.

EVAGORAS.

That was because I had not the pleasure of meeting Socrates.

SOCRATES.

This is at least obligingly said; but,
lay-

118 DIALOGUE IV.

laying aside all compliments, I must tell you, there was something more than this, in the case;—you were angry, Evagoras;—I saw resentment painted in your looks.—

EVAGORAS.

In my looks, Socrates!

SOCRATES.

Yes, Evagoras, in your looks; there was something or other, that stung you inwardly, and rendered you uneasy.

EVAGORAS.

What makes you think so?

SOCRATES.

I perceived it by the dry and abrupt answers you gave to one who spoke to you.

EVAGORAS.

To whom?

SOCRATES.

To Agonistes the son of Timias. Pray what had he done to deserve this?

EVAGORAS.

Agonistes!

SOCRA-

DI A L O G U E IV. 119

S O C R A T E S.

Yes; you refused to wrestle with him:

E V A G O R A S.

I confess it, Socrates; and I think I had some reason for this refusal.

S O C R A T E S.

There is something in all this, that wants to be cleared up. Tell me honestly, Evagoras, what it was that displeased you in this youth?

E V A G O R A S.

The other day, Socrates, he aimed his Quoit in so aukward a manner, that it struck against my arm, and bruised it violently.

S O C R A T E S.

Surely, Evagoras, this alone could not offend you. Such an accident may give pain, but should never excite resentment: we may be sorry that it should have happened, but should by no means lay the blame upon those who have been, innocently, the occasion of it.

—Pray

120 DIALOGUE IV.

—Pray did you not wrestle with Agonistes?

EVAGORAS.

I did : but why do you ask me that question?

SOCRATES.

You know, that is my way.—Which of you gained the victory?

EVAGORAS.

After I had withstood for some time his most vigorous efforts, in a close and obstinate engagement, my foot slipped, I know not how—I fell—and from thence he took occasion to boast that he had defeated me.

SOCRATES.

Were there many spectators present?

EVAGORAS.

A vast multitude, and of all ranks.

SOCRATES.

Now, Evagoras, I understand the matter well, and must speak to you with that frankness, and liberty, which our friend-

DIALOGUE IV. 121

friendship entitles, and even commands me to use upon this occasion.

EVAGORAS.

What does this mean, Socrates?

SOCRATES.

Only that you were vexed at your defeat; it has put you out of humour: this is the truth of the matter, and hence the real occasion of your uneasiness.

EVAGORAS.

It is true, I was filled with confusion and vexation, to see one, who ordinarily is so much inferior to me in dexterity, gain the advantage, and that in the view of such a numerous assembly.

SOCRATES.

This, Evagoras, is what I wanted you to acknowledge.—Agonistes has conquered you, and now you begin to conquer yourself: this is by much the noblest victory of the two. And I own that I was not a little diverted with the combat that has now passed in your

G

breast,

breast, between the vanity of *self-love*, and the efforts of *sincerity*, which have been wrestling against each other for some moments. Both the contention and the champions amused me mightily; *self-love* excels in subtlety; *sincerity* surpasses in force: the former leaves no stratagem untried, no evasion that it does not put in practice to avoid a defeat, and it too often comes off with success. But for this time, Evagoras, it is fairly vanquished; and I, who am the only spectator of the combat, applaud your victory, and entreat you to pursue it.

E V A G O R A S.

What remains yet to be done in this matter?

S O C R A T E S.

It is not enough to have thus acknowledged your secret resentment: you must yet go farther: you must stifle its growth; you must efface it in your mind.

E V A -

DIALOGUE IV. 123

EVAGORAS.

But how is it possible to become insensible to such an affront?

SOCRATES.

There can be no affront where there was no intention to offend. That you should feel some inward confusion upon reflecting on your want of dexterity, or strength, is not at all surprizing; nor indeed is it blameable. You may be out of humour with yourself, if you please, but there is no sort of reason why you should blame your antagonist for doing what you would certainly have done in the same circumstances. Pray do justice to Agonistes, and be impartial to yourself: esteem him somewhat more, and yourself somewhat less, and then all will go well. I love you, Evagoras, and for that very reason I am not at all sorry that this event has happened to you.

G 2

EVA-

124 D I A L O G U E IV.

E V A G O R A S.

There is however something extraordinary in this manner of shewing your friendship.

S O C R A T E S.

Extraordinary as it may seem, it is your real good that I have here in view. Is it not true that you were deeply mortified by the event we speak of?

E V A G O R A S.

I acknowledge, that I was.

S O C R A T E S.

You would of consequence have been equally elated with the glory of a victory; for those feelings, and passions that counterbalance one another, bear generally a just proportion in the degrees of their intenseness.

E V A G O R A S.

This I believe to be almost always the case.

S O C R A T E S.

If then your displeasure in the present
sent

DIALOGUE IV. 125

sent case goes the length of vexation and resentment, your joy, had the event turned out otherwise, would, no doubt, have degenerated into insolence and vain-glory.

EVAGORAS.

This is but too possible.

SOCRATES.

Yes, Evagoras, I have a strong notion that repeated success would elate you too much, render you arrogant and presumptuous, and draw upon you the envy of your friends. It is much better, that glory should be divided, and that each one should have his part in the distribution. This maintains that equality which is so essential to friendship, and that modesty which is so requisite in man.

EVAGORAS.

I see very well, Socrates, the tendency of your discourse, and, to shew you that I know how to make use of your in-

G 3

structions,

structions, I shall immediately seek an opportunity of embracing Agonistes.

SOCRATES.

This declaration, my dear Evagoras, gives me the highest satisfaction. Now is your victory complete, and you may claim the glory of a double triumph; for, after having conquered your vanity, you have also vanquished your resentment. Herein consists true greatness of soul, and I see in a Prince so capable of governing himself, the true Hero, that is alone worthy to command others.

EVAGORAS.

It is to you, Socrates, that I stand indebted for the honour of this little triumph. But, to clear up perfectly the subject before us, I would be glad to know, whether you do not approve of that noble ambition that has for its objects the approbation of the Public, and a conspicuous appearance in the eye of the world?

SOCRA-

SOCRATES.

No doubt, Evagoras, the esteem of others is precious in itself, and is a most powerful motive to animate us to virtue. But never imagine, that capacity and talents can alone attract the approbation of the Wise; this is due principally to virtue, and among the virtues, you know the distinguished rank that is given to *sincerity* and modesty.

EVAGORAS.

But the *sincerity* you speak of does not surely oblige us to say every thing we know, and to make an open declaration of our secret sentiments.

SOCRATES.

By no means, Evagoras; this would be indiscretion; but candour and sincerity must be directed by prudence. We must keep our own secrets, and also those that are entrusted with us by others. Neither is it always proper to discover the little esteem we have for

certain persons, or to reveal our sentiments when they would only be offensive, without doing service. But, at the same time, a man of probity will never speak against his inward persuasion; he will never conceal a truth that may be useful; nor, if he is asked, will he dissemble even in things that are indifferent; but in a more especial manner he will cautiously avoid all sorts of equivocation and artifice. One of my neighbours in the country is often heard to say, “that nothing rolls easier than a bowl.”

E V A G O R A S.

By this he certainly means that the man who goes roundly to work (if I may use the expression) who is plain and ingenuous in his discourse and in his proceedings, will succeed the best in his affairs, and find the least opposition, and incumbrance in his passage through life; and doubtless he is
in

DIALOGUE IV. 129

in the right. I can give him, in return for his proverb, a maxim of one of our Sages, that has the same tendency; for I remember to have read in some of their writings, that *Honesty is the best Policy*.

SOCRATES.

Good: Evagoras, let us hold to this maxim; we have no occasion to go any farther. But what do you think of a certain sort of dissimulation that I perceive often in a young man of your acquaintance?

EVAGORAS.

Who is the young man you have in view?

SOCRATES.

You should rather ask, what sort of dissimulation I mean; for the knowledge of the person is not material to our present purpose; I only want to have your opinion of that kind of reserve, which is too frequently to be remarked in his behaviour. He avoids discover-

G 5 ing

130 D I A L O G U E IV.

ing his inclinations, his taste, his sentiments; and that merely through a fearful apprehension of being corrected or contradicted. What do you think of this, Evagoras?

E V A G O R A S.

This, I imagine, may proceed from a timorous disposition, or from a certain bashfulness and modesty natural to Youth: he chuses perhaps to be rather undetermined in his taste, and inclinations, than to be thought positive and obstinate in maintaining any particular opinion.

S O C R A T E S.

To be wholly undetermined, to be without any prevailing inclination, and desire, are marks of that indolence which differs little from stupidity; but to fear the discovery of our notions to such as we may converse with familiarly, to intimates and friends who are willing to afford us direction and advice; this leaves
too

DIALOGUE IV. 131

too much room to suspect that under the cover of timorousness there lies concealed that reserved and haughty spirit that is impatient of contradiction. It is much more reasonable, and shews a greater degree of docility and candour, to discover with modesty our sentiments and inclinations, though this should expose us to be corrected in the one, and disappointed in the other.

EVAGORAS.

But why reveal those sentiments, which, we fear, are not just, and which consequently may be disadvantageous to us in the opinion of others?

SOCRATES.

I have already insinuated that the prudent exercise of this ingenuous candour and openness of mind depends upon the characters and quality of those with whom we converse. If we are among strangers, who are little disposed either to excuse our faults, or to correct our

132 D I A L O G U E IV.

errors; in such a case, the circumspection and caution of which you have been speaking, are just and well-placed; but with friends, who only observe our faults with a design to admonish us kindly, and render us a real service by correcting them, the case is quite different: not to think aloud with such, is to be wanting in the duty we owe to them, and also in the regard which we owe to ourselves.

E V A G O R A S.

I should rather imagine that caution even among such were the most likely way to preserve a place in their friendship, and to secure to us their esteem.

S O C R A T E S.

On the contrary, the discovery of your artifice will lessen you in their esteem; and sooner or later this discovery must be made; for to think of carrying on the counterfeit long, that is impossible: a man might as reasonably
hope

DIALOGUE IV. 133

hope to conceal himself under a covering of net-work, as to hide his inward and real character from those whom he constantly frequents.

E V A G O R A S.

But you will at least allow that by this caution and reserve, this prudent artifice in concealing our weaknesses, we shew a delicacy that is decent and laudable.

S O C R A T E S.

This is false shame, and not delicacy. True delicacy will not harbour faults, and true modesty will own them, to have them removed. Employ in correcting your faults the pains which you take to conceal them; this is the effect that true and ingenuous shame should produce. Let us suppose a Patient, to whom his Physician addresses a variety of questions concerning the state of his health, his constitution, and the diet or regimen he observes; pray how
do

134 D I A L O G U E IV.

do you think he should answer in such a case?

E V A G O R A S.

Certainly he would do wrong in concealing the least circumstance; for how, otherwise, should the physician be rendered capable of giving him the advice that is suitable to his condition?

S O C R A T E S.

And do not you believe, Evagoras, that the mind has its infirmities and diseases as well as the body?

E V A G O R A S.

Yes, Socrates; and I have heard you say that ignorance, error, and vice are so many diseases of the soul, and that wisdom, on the contrary, is its soundness and its health.

S O C R A T E S.

And at what period of life do you think man the most exposed to this kind of infirmities or mental diseases?

E V A -

DIALOGUE IV. 135

EVAGORAS.

I imagine it must be at that age, when the mind is not as yet formed, for want of experience; for then the passions are strong, and reason is feeble.

SOCRATES.

You see therefore, Evagoras, that at this age, which is the early season of childhood and youth, it is absolutely necessary to have some one, to whom we can discover our sentiments and inclinations without reserve.

EVAGORAS.

I see indeed how necessary it is to have, for this purpose, some one that is capable of healing these infirmities; and for my own part, I think I cannot address myself better, than to the able physician who is so well acquainted with my mental constitution.

SOCRATES.

I desire your confidence with no other view than that I may become your physician

136 D I A L O G U E IV.

fician in this respect; this is the only title upon which I pretend to that trust which you shall think proper to place in me. Be assured that he who deceives others by concealing his faults, is his own dupe, and that in the worst sense, as by this he is deprived of the best means both of knowing and removing his errors. It is only by shewing ourselves as we really are, that we can learn to become what we ought to be.

E V A G O R A S.

This is a maxim that deserves a place among the many excellent ones I have received from you; and might I not add to this, that by indulging themselves without restraint in these little artifices men insensibly contract prevailing habits of dissimulation and hypocrisy?

S O C R A T E S.

I love you, Evagoras, for this observation: it is admirably just, and is
also

also of the highest importance in the present question. In reality, when men once give into artifice, it knows no bounds; from one point it will extend its influence to others, and form by degrees a predominant tendency to falsehood and dissimulation.

E V A G O R A S.

Nothing is more odious, than such a character, and I think it is impossible to be too cautious in avoiding whatsoever may lead to it. At the same time, Socrates, what you have been saying necessarily supposes that those who have the inspection of youth should allow them that liberty, which discovers their inward sentiments and character, and let pass without reproof a thousand extravagant thoughts that float in their imagination; otherwise, they will early learn to dissemble, or at least be restrained from speaking at all.

S O C R A T E S.

SOCRATES.

In this you judge perfectly right, Evagoras; I have always been of opinion that young people should be allowed to speak without restraint; this is the only way to know them thoroughly: if they think justly we encourage; if wrong, we correct them. It is by advice applied seasonably, and administered with mildness, that we enlighten their reason, and bring it by degrees to maturity and strength.

EVAGORAS.

Do not you think also, that the ingenuous simplicity of nature, which appears in all they say, should engage us often to excuse their faults?

SOCRATES.

Affuredly: there is nothing that disarms us, like an honest confession: there is nothing that attracts forgiveness like sincerity and candour; and though frankness and ingenuity are becoming in all,

all, yet they are in a peculiar manner the ornament of youth.

EVAGORAS.

How, Socrates?

SOCRATES.

Because at that age we look for the expression of simple nature, as yet uncorrupted by the artifice of the world; and as that also is the critical period in which we stand most in need of counsel, so openness and candour are then most necessary to discover our inward sentiments and characters, without the knowledge of which it is impossible to administer to us that advice that is suitable to our condition.

EVAGORAS.

It was for this purpose, I suppose, that a certain Philosopher said once to a young man, *Speak, that I may see thee.*

SOCRATES.

Without doubt, Evagoras, and it would be an happy thing, were this
salutary

140 D I A L O G U E IV.

salutary counsel attended to, and improved by every individual. *Disimulation* is a mask that men wear expressly that they may not be known; and it is by this deceitful vizard that human society is rendered a commerce of imposture and fraud. If we have any inclination to live in the amiable exercise of mutual confidence towards each other, let us leave the mask to Comic representations and Theatrical personages, and shew ourselves in real life with the characters that belong to us.

The end of the Fourth Dialogue.



DIALOGUE V.
CONCERNING
A frivolous disposition, or a zeal
for trifles.

SOCRATES, EVAGORAS,
MICROPHILUS.

MICROPHILUS.

I Implore your protection, Socrates,
and earnestly entreat your assistance.

SOCRATES.

Against whom? young stranger: has
any Athenian violated, with regard to
you, the sacred laws of hospitality?

MICROPHILUS.

Oh! not at all: but Evagoras ban-
ters me unmercifully, and, I am per-
suaded, it is you alone that can reduce
him to silence.

SOCRATES.

S O C R A T E S.

You know that in all our public sports there are judges appointed. Do you chuse that I should be yours? for in all appearance your contest is no more than a sport: tell me, however, the subject of it, and on what the raillery of Evagoras turns?

M I C R O P H I L U S.

Nay, let him tell that himself, for he is the aggressor; you will see that it is a very trifle.

E V A G O R A S.

You shall judge, Socrates: when I met him the other day, what do you think was the important object, that drew his whole attention? A new clasp, forsooth, that I had on my habit, and a robe which I wore of the manufacture of Plutogenes the Milesian: the fashion and the price of this garment furnished him matter for a long and solemn discourse.

M I C R O -

MICROPHILUS.

And what is there so surprizing in all this? Is there any thing more natural, any thing more usual, than for young people to dwell upon such subjects?

EVAGORAS.

Had you said for young girls, you would not be far wrong. It was thus that the daughters of king Lycomedes amused themselves, but the attention of Achilles was quite otherwise employed.

MICROPHILUS.

However, elegance and taste in point of dress, and the knowledge of those that are ingenious in procuring us this satisfaction, do not appear to me to be matters of an indifferent nature.

EVAGORAS.

The nature of the season should be considered in our apparel, to render it commodious; and our rank and age, to render it decent; and the care of all this should be left to our taylor: but
to

144 D I A L O G U E V.

to be perpetually gaping after new fashions, to be running into endless niceties and refinements in point of dress, and to make it the object of our serious occupation, this in reality is egregious trifling.

S O C R A T E S.

I have heard wise men say, that there is a just medium to be observed in this matter, and that we ought to steer between the two extremes which form the characters of the Sloven, and the Fop. We should not distinguish ourselves either by the negligence or nicety of our dress; let us pay to the mode the regards that decency requires, but let it neither be the subject of our discourse, nor a matter that we look upon as worthy to employ us seriously.

M I C R O P H I L U S.

Agreed: but Evagoras can tell you that our conversation does not always turn upon such objects. We discourse frequent-

frequently upon points of science, and reason upon useful passages of history.

E V A G O R A S.

This is true: but Microphilus carries along with him, in all matters, that frivolous disposition with which I reproach him, and treats even the solemnity of science with the spirit of a trifler. To give you an example: we were talking, the other day, of the expedition of the Argonauts; now what do you think it was, that attracted his attention, and affected him most in this famous story? Why, it was the mention, that some writer has made, of the figure of a Triton, with a large mouth, that was painted upon the stern of the ship Argos.

M I C R O P H I L U S.

'Tis true, I cannot help laughing when I think of the figure of the Triton; I imagine that I see him, with his great gaping maw.

H

E V A-

E V A G O R A S.

You hear him, Socrates : surely this circumstance was highly essential in the conduct of that renowned expedition.

S O C R A T E S.

Pray, then, let us know, Evagoras, what are the circumstances in this event that draw your attention ?

E V A G O R A S.

My curiosity is employed in enquiring, who were the Heroes that embarked with Jason in this famous expedition ; whether it is true that Orpheus was of the number, as some have imagined ; by what acts of prudence or valour each one signalized himself ; what was the true end of this bold enterprise (for the Golden Fleece is but a mere allegory ;) what course they steered ; what dangers and difficulties they surmounted in these early times, when navigation was in its infancy. I am curious to know how it came to pass that several of the

Con-

Constellations derive their names from this famous voyage. In a word, I would be glad to be informed what were the benefits that accrued to Greece from this expedition, and whether, in the result, they surpassed the disadvantages with which it might be attended. This, I think, is the proper improvement that we should make of the study of History, and the end that we should propose in applying ourselves to it.

MICROPHILUS.

For my part, the end that I propose by it, is only to find something that may contribute to my amusement.

SOCRATES.

Have you done, Evagoras? or have you yet something more to add to the accusation you bring against Microphilus?

EVAGORAS.

There is yet one thing, which I reserved for the last. Would you believe

it, Socrates, that if in the freedom of conversation, any one throws in a jest, a repartee, an amusing story, or a piece of wit, Microphilus will recall it perhaps three months after with a loud laugh, entirely out of season, nay even in the midst of the most serious conversation? I beseech you, cure him of this weakness: you will in this render me service, for I fear its infection.

S O C R A T E S.

You plead with such warmth, that I find myself obliged to take the part of the stranger, and to defend him against you, as far as I can.

E V A G O R A S.

What! is it possible

S O C R A T E S.

A little patience, Evagoras. In the mean time, that we may converse more at our ease, let us sit down for a moment.

M I C R O -

DIALOGUE V. 149

MICROPHILUS.

Good; I am like to find here an advocate for my cause.

EVAGORAS.

Say rather, an equitable and competent judge.

MICROPHILUS.

But, Socrates, I think the dignity of a judge requires that you should have a better place: pray sit a little higher up, and that will give you more the air of precedence.

SOCRATES.

With all my heart: now I am as you desire.

EVAGORAS.

Am I placed to your satisfaction?

MICROPHILUS.

By no means: you must sit yet a little lower, and then we shall form a regular triangle: move you towards the right; so—'tis well; and I will incline to the left; that will render the order

H 3

com-

150 D I A L O G U E V.

complete, and look extremely pretty.

S O C R A T E S.

Have you finished?

M I C R O P H I L U S.

Hold, a moment; as Evagoras is lower than me in stature, he must sit a little higher, that our heads may be in a line.

S O C R A T E S (*Aside.*)

Indeed if Evagoras be below thee in any thing, it can only be in bodily size.

E V A G O R A S.

Is the whole ceremonial now regulated? You see, Socrates, a new proof of his attachment to trifles. Are my reproaches then without foundation?

S O C R A T E S.

But I hope, Evagoras, that you do not blame a taste for regularity.

E V A G O R A S.

By no means: on the contrary, I highly approve of it, wherever it is
necessary;

DIALOGUE V. 151

necessary; but to distinguish ourselves by a passion for symmetry and precision in things that do not at all require them, and which would be every whit as well without them, this, I think, is attention impertinently placed, and is exercising our invention in a very trifling manner.

S O C R A T E S.

But is there not something noble in extending our attention to the smallest matters, so as to let nothing escape our observation?

E V A G O R A S.

I confess that the Omniscient Being, the Supreme Intelligence, may embrace at the same time an infinity of objects, and bestow an equal attention upon them all; but the mind of man cannot act in this unbounded sphere: limited in its views, as well as in its power, capable only of a small degree of knowledge, and activity, it should employ these

on objects that are useful, and pass by things that are indifferent, since it cannot attend to all. And in this, I dare say, our great Hippocrates will be on my side, who said wisely, that *science is long, while life is short.*

S O C R A T E S.

But may not attention to small matters be considered as the mark of a vast genius, which can take in, at one and the same time, a multitude of objects?

E V A G O R A S.

I apprehend that it rather proves the contrary, and that the attention which is thrown away on little things, is thereby necessarily diverted from matters of superior moment and importance. I fear much that through an attachment to trifles men come by degrees to neglect what is essential to their honour and happiness, and even to lose sight of it.

S O C R A T E S.

But pray, Evagoras, what do you
call

DIALOGUE V. 153

call trifles? perhaps you impose that name upon things that have their uses, while you lavish the epithets of *essential* and *important* on matters that are not really such. You must think that the value of things is a *relative* quality, and depends upon a great variety of considerations. For example; you blame Microphilus for his taste and curiosity in point of brocades; and yet you see the general applause that is given to the Tyrian merchant lately arrived here for his judgment and skill in such sort of manufactures; his conversation turns principally on this subject, and it offends none, as far as I can observe.

MICROPHILUS (to EVAGORAS)

What do you think now? I knew Socrates would be more indulgent than you.

EVAGORAS (to MICROPHILUS)

Have patience a little; we are not as yet come to the conclusion; you are not

H 5 acquainted

acquainted with the method of Socrates, but you will soon see where he will lead you. (To SOCRATES)

In my opinion the Tyrian merchant is worthy of approbation, because it is his business to be versed in such matters; this is his science, this is his employment in society; and this science is, no doubt, useful in its place: but we do not however see such persons as Socrates applying in this way their talents and their study; and how comes this to pass? it does not surely proceed from want of curiosity, or dexterity; none will venture to lay this to your charge: but the case is, that it becomes Socrates to employ his attention on more worthy objects and on nobler pursuits.

SO CR A T E S.

According to your notion, then, that which we call *great* or *little*, is *relative* to the different ranks and characters of men.

E V A-

DIALOGUE V. 155

EVAGORAS.

Doubtless, and here I call to mind the distinction which we established in * a former conversation, between that which constitutes the merit of man considered in general, and the relative kind of merit that belongs to each particular station and profession in life.

SOCRATES.

Your application of this distinction is ingenious, Evagoras; but can you decide by this what things are important, and what are not?

EVAGORAS.

There is nothing more easy: things that are important may be divided into two sorts; of the first sort are those things that are essentially important to all men, because they tend necessarily to render them wise, sociable, and happy in every state and circumstance of life; such are *piety, virtue, good-sense,* and

* See Dialogue the first.

good-nature: these are of indispensable importance and of universal necessity. Of the second sort are those things that are only rendered important by their conformity to a certain age, a certain profession, or their being proper for the accomplishment of some particular end and purpose; of this kind are the respective sciences of *Manufacturers*, *Mechanics*, *Mariners*, and such like: as much as it is becoming in such persons to expatiate upon these arts even to the minutest circumstances that concern them, so much would it be unseemly in a Senator, or a General to bestow their whole attention upon such subjects; and as it would be ridiculous in a *Mariner* to aim at the profession of a *Grammarian*, so would it also be an extravagant piece of folly in a *Rhetorician*, or an *Orator*, to employ his time in examining the structure of a ship, or his study on matters that relate to navigation.

DIALOGUE V. 157

MICROPHILUS.

I conclude from what you have been saying, that we should attach ourselves to the pursuit of things that are of general use; and then, more particularly, to those that belong to our vocation in life.

EVAGORAS.

Pray tell me, Microphilus, would it flatter your vanity to be versed in all the little details that belong to the employment of a nurse?

MICROPHILUS.

No surely: what do you mean by this, Evagoras? would it become me to stoop to such a low, such a mean occupation?

EVAGORAS.

This profession, however, as low as you may think it, is of general use, and is certainly much more necessary in the world, than those baubles and trifles that numbers of persons are not ashamed to make the matter of their occupation every day.

SOCRA-

158 DIALOGUE V.

SOCRATES.

Do not urge the matter too far, Evagoras: you allow that the importance of things varies with respect to different persons, according to their different characters and vocations; and that *great* and *little* are qualities *relative* to the ends which we are destined to pursue in life; so that what is little with respect to one profession may be great with respect to another. Do not you grant this?

EVAGORAS.

I do.

SOCRATES.

And do you know that this single word may make you lose your cause?

EVAGORAS.

How?

SOCRATES.

Pray how do you know what the views of Microphilus may be, and what he may propose to himself as his end in life?

DIALOGUE V. 159

life? Perhaps, he has no inclination to business, nor any ambition of filling those stations by which he might be ornamental or useful to society. Now, if this be the case, you will readily grant that what you call trifles may be of great use to him, and that amusing the ladies, and killing time, may be matters of no small importance to one who has no other ends or purposes in view.

MICROPHILUS.

Hold, Socrates, I perceive the irony that lies under this apology. Certainly, it is not my design to act such a frivolous part in life, as you now speak of. My birth points out to me a higher destination, and I should be extremely concerned, if I were not to fill an honourable rank in the service of my Country.

SOCRATES.

You must excuse me, Microphilus.

As

160 D I A L O G U E V.

As I neither was acquainted with your quality, nor your views, I was seeking some apology for your attachment to trifles; but after what you have now said, I find myself obliged to change my style.

M I C R O P H I L U S.

The attachment you speak of will quickly pass: it is an effect of that levity that is natural to youth: some time hence, I shall apply myself to more important matters. Do not you observe in the progress of nature itself, that the flowers appear before the fruits?

S O C R A T E S.

True, but you do not consider that the fruit, yet tender, is enclosed in the flower, which assures us of its existence, and promises its maturity, and thus displays the beautiful union of pleasure with utility. I do not require in Youth that gravity that is becoming
in

D I A L O G U E V. 161

in advanced years, but they cannot begin too early to discern and pursue those objects that are distinguished by their usefulness and dignity: they must soon learn to look upon trifles in their true light, and to treat them as such, only by way of transitory amusement, without suffering them to occupy their serious thoughts, or divert them from things of greater consequence. If this distinction is not made early in life, I doubt much whether it will be ever made at all.

M I C R O P H I L U S.

You have, without doubt, some general principle in view, upon which you form this conclusion?

S O C R A T E S.

Yes, the important principle that Evagoras mentioned a little while ago, *that the limited capacity of man not being sufficient to take in all objects, it is highly to be feared that the love of trifles*
will

162 D I A L O G U E V.

will produce negligence in matters of importance. But there is another great principle, which we should never lose sight of, and which is intimately connected with the present question.

M I C R O P H I L U S.

And what is that, Socrates?

S O C R A T E S.

That we should set upon every object its just value, proportioning always the measure of our esteem to the degree of its real and intrinsic worth.

M I C R O P H I L U S.

There is nothing more reasonable than this maxim; and, I dare say, none will presume to call the truth of it in question.

S O C R A T E S.

Men do not deny it, but they forget it, they lose sight of it; and this forgetfulness is the source of almost all those follies that degrade human nature. By this the order of things is overturned:
hence

hence the zeal with which men pursue things of a trifling nature, and their profound indifference about those which are of the greatest moment and consequence ; hence so much attention to the *accessory*, and so little to the *essential*, in the affairs of life. This perversity of judgment is too common in the world, and was never perhaps more visible, than in the present age, which we extol so much for the politeness of its manners and the elegance of its taste.

E V A G O R A S.

To clear up this, Socrates, may I ask an example, as that is your admirable method of instructing ?

S O C R A T E S.

The examples here are but too numerous. Turn your eyes towards those fashionable Sparks that shine in the circles of polite company ; enter into discourse with them upon the sublime truths of religion, the important duties
of

of life, the nature of civil government, or the interesting discoveries of learning and science, and observe with what levity and merriment they will treat such subjects, with what a careless air they will dispatch them in a moment, as if it were a matter of perfect indifference, what judgments they formed concerning them. But turn the conversation upon things that suit their puerile taste, and then you will see the solemnity and zeal with which they will descant upon the most egregious trifles: here you will see them treat as fools, and regard with the utmost pity or contempt, such as are not drest in the top of the fashion, such as are not acquainted with the newest inventions and the nicest terms in the sublime art of *good eating*, and such as are so pedantically obstinate as not to follow the reigning taste in the smallest matters: here, their conversation is serious, and their rules are rigid;
and

DIALOGUE V. 165

and while they lavish their jokes upon religion and virtue, they will not digest the least banter that is levelled against the mode. In a word, they treat matters of importance as if they were trifles, and trifles as if they were matters of the highest importance.

EVAGORAS.

Surely, in this they efface the dictates of common sense, and the very principles on which true taste is founded; for, if I mistake not, taste is founded upon the maxim already mentioned, that every thing should have the place that belongs to it, and be esteemed in proportion to its real value.

SOCRATES.

Without doubt, Evagoras: and you do well to put the matter upon this footing, since many vaunt themselves more on account of the delicacy of their taste, than the depth of their reason. But leaving this species of butterflies, a
more

466 D I A L O G U E V.

more solemn kind of triflers present themselves to my view; pray what do you think of our† *Sophists*?

E V A G O R A S.

I remember to have heard you treat them pretty severely on several occasions.

S O C R A T E S.

And surely with the utmost reason, as they are really the corrupters of all true genius and taste. The gift of

† The persons whom Mr. Vernet represents Socrates as passing in review here, were much of the same stamp with (what are commonly called among us) the Scholastic writers, who rendered common sense unintelligible by their intricate terms, and disguised it so barbarously under the ostentatious pomp of hard words and tedious circumlocutions, that the knowledge of their language was much more difficult, than that of the things which it was designed to explain. It was thus that by their vain subtlety they perverted language from a mean of instruction into a matter of study, and made that which was destined to unfold science, a science of itself.

speech

speech was conferred upon mankind as a mean of instruction; but how do they use it? They forget the end, and substitute the means in its place; they harangue out of a mere ostentation of words; they display their periods with an idle vanity, and make of language an instrument of declamation, that dazzles without enlightening; and of dispute, that puzzles without convincing. The pursuit of truth seems with them to be out of the question; eloquence and subtlety are all that they aim at; and this surely is miserable trifling.

EVAGORAS.

From all this I conclude, that our first aim in all things should be *truth*; and that proceeding from this principle, we should pursue those truths that are of the greatest *utility*.

SOCRATES.

Your conclusion, Evagoras, is perfectly just: *truth* and *utility* are the two poles

poles of the rational world. Before all things, pursue what is *true*; but as all truths are not equally interesting and important, apply yourself to the search of *useful truths*, and overlook the rest; this is the criterion of sound judgment.

M I C R O P H I L U S.

I have no reason to complain of the reproaches of Evagoras, since they have procured me the benefit of such an instructive conversation and such salutary directions. I am now persuaded that true satisfaction is not to be found in those little things that have hitherto so much employed my attention; and I am not at all surprized that Evagoras should have such a superiority over me, in point of judgment, when I consider his intimacy with Socrates. But may I not, in my turn, reproach him with unkindness, in not procuring me the opportunity of sharing this advantage with him?

S O C R A -

SOCRATES.

In this, Microphilus, I will do you full justice. You may be present, when you please, at our future conversations. I perceive by your accent that you are from some of the Grecian towns in Italy: pray, tell me, is it true that the Romans who govern in Latium, are possessed of that noble and manly spirit, that aims at grand and arduous pursuits.

MICROPHILUS.

It is very true, Socrates; and such is their progress, that it is thought they will not only surpass the Greeks in valour, but excell them also in point of genius.

SOCRATES.

I can readily believe it; for it is visible to me, by the superficial and trifling taste that reigns among us, that the genius of Greece tends to its decline. I have been told that these Romans have a most excellent proverb in their language;

170 DIALOGUE V.

guage; *An eagle, say they, does not amuse itself in catching flies.* O Evagoras, and you, Microphilus, be ye eagles, because your rank and destination call you to this; ye are not born to be wrens.

The end of the Fifth Dialogue.



DIALOGUE VI.

CONCERNING

The value we should set upon
the esteem and approbation
of Men.

SOCRATES, EVAGORAS,
MICROPHILUS.

SOCRATES.

I Am glad to see you together again
notwithstanding your late dispute.
By this I see that the contests of friends,
like the quarrels of lovers, add new
warmth and strength to their union.

MICROPHILUS.

So it often happens, Socrates, especially when the vehemence of their passions is moderated by the commanding influence of such wisdom as yours, and

172 DIALOGUE VI.

they are reduced by it to the bounds that reason forbids us to transgress. We have once more, however, need of your interposition to bring us to an agreement.

SOCRATES.

What is then the subject of your present dispute?

MICROPHILUS.

I was applauding that maxim of one of our Philosophers, *Hide thy life*; but Evagoras does not at all approve of it; he is of opinion that we should be ardent in the pursuit of glory, and take every opportunity of extending our fame, and of displaying our actions, so as to stand distinguished in the eye of the world; and he opposes to my maxim the saying of Themistocles, *that the laurels of Miltiades disturbed his rest*.

EVAGORAS.

And is it not indeed true that the love of glory forms Heroes, while the
maxim

maxim of Microphilus is only proper to cover cowardice and sloth, by placing them in obscurity, and thus to nourish low inclinations, and confine the mind to groveling pursuits?

SOCRATES.

There is, at least, one case in which it may be prudent to follow the maxim of Microphilus.

EVAGORAS.

In what case, Socrates?

SOCRATES.

When we are so unhappy as to live under a tyrannical government; woe to such as distinguish themselves under the suspicious eye of *Despotism* by shining and public virtues! It is obscurity alone, that can afford here a secure retreat from danger.

MICROPHILUS.

I cannot think that the Philosopher, who administered this salutary counsel, meant to confine it to this particular

I 3

case;

174 D I A L O G U E VI.

case; he certainly designed it for more general use.

S O C R A T E S.

Tell me, Microphilus, is it possible for man to live alone?

M I C R O P H I L U S.

No; he stands in need, no doubt, of the assistance of others; and, I know, it is a main principle with you, that we are born for society.

S O C R A T E S.

This principle is the immediate dictate of nature. We enter into the world under a variety of relations: we have parents, friends, countrymen, with whom we live, and from whom we receive many good offices. Can we retire from the view of such? and, if we could, would it be proper to do so? The man whose conduct is virtuous and decent, has no reason to fear the light; and I don't think Evagoras was in the wrong when he said that obscurity serves frequently

quently as a cover to inglorious actions.

MICROPHILUS.

The maxim then in question may perhaps be more properly understood as designed to guard us against ambition, and to recommend to us the tranquillity of a private life; in this sense, I dare say, Socrates will not reject it.

SOCRATES.

And why not, Microphilus? pray, tell me, is it not necessary that a country should have its Judges or Chiefs, in short, that some one or more be established in power and authority to govern the People?

MICROPHILUS.

This I confess; but we should leave the care of this to others.

SOCRATES.

And to whom would you leave it? to Fools, or to the Wise? to the Wicked, or to the Good?

MICROPHILUS.

It were undoubtedly to be wished that the reins of government were entrusted only with the Virtuous and the Wise; for authority placed in bad hands is the greatest misfortune that can befall a country.

SOCRATES.

You see then that the advice of the philosopher, *to bide our life*, is, in no sense, applicable to men of virtue.

MICROPHILUS.

This I perceive; but you will acknowledge at the same time that the ambition of spreading our name in the world, and of employing the tongues of the multitude, is a high piece of folly.

EVAGORAS.

I am not afraid of the judgment of Socrates in this matter; he will not surely condemn such a noble passion, as the love of glory; a passion, that is peculiar

liar to great minds, and the incentive to virtuous and heroic deeds.

SOCRATES.

All this is well, Evagoras, provided that the love of glory be not pushed to excess.

MICROPHILUS.

I see that our wise pilot steers justly between extremes, and endeavours to make us pass with dexterity between Scylla and Charybdis.

EVAGORAS.

What is then the extreme that we ought to avoid in the pursuit of glory?

SOCRATES.

In order to explain this matter, pray tell me, Evagoras, how you would be affected, if, upon your appearing in the places of public resort, you were saluted with the shouts of the populace, and heard them extolling the gracefulness of your person, the wonders of your valour, or the power of your eloquence?

EVAGORAS.

Such acclamations would be, to me, extremely ridiculous and insipid: what account can be made of the capricious judgment of an ignorant multitude, who will praise to day, and censure to morrow, and who in their applauses and their reproaches act, equally, without reason, and always with levity?

SOCRATES.

Does it not also happen, and that frequently, that the multitude lavish their applause upon actions that are far from being worthy of approbation or praise?

EVAGORAS.

Doubtless the people bestow their encomiums rather upon actions that have a shining outside, and make a noise in the world, than on those that are founded in equity and justice. They admire conquerors who frequently are little better than usurpers; and extol that libera-

liberality which is often employed as a mean of corruption, and at the expence of honesty, and probity of mind.

SOCRATES.

Still farther: I do not imagine that you would be eagerly desirous of such compliments, and encomiums, as men should address to you immediately, and in your presence?

EVAGORAS.

This is the true character of flattery, which is frequently insincere, and always dangerous.

SOCRATES.

And do you think that in the performance of our duty, and in the service of our Country, we should be animated by no other motives, nor propose to ourselves any other end, than spreading our name in the world, and becoming the subject of its conversation and applause?

EVAGORAS.

By no means: the excellence of virtue

I 6

should

should oblige us to the performance of our duty, and the love of our Country should lead us to advance its interests, and engage us in its service, even were there no prospect of that honour and renown which are the natural consequences of such virtuous pursuits.

S O C R A T E S.

At present then, Evgoras, you may easily give us a definition of *false glory*; the answers you have made to the questions I proposed, shew plainly in what it consists.

E V A G O R A S.

False glory is that which is acquired by actions that are rather specious and dazzling in their appearance, than just and equitable in their nature. It consists in the acclamations of a giddy multitude, and the applause of flatterers. In a word, it forms the character of those, in whom the desire of praise is the spring of action, the motive that animates their conduct, and the principal

DIALOGUE VI. 181

principal end to which it is directed. But however this be, Socrates, it is not surely your opinion, that we should despise every kind of glory, and be utterly indifferent about our reputation in the world?

SOCRATES.

Not at all, Evagoras; there is a *species* of glory which is *just* in its foundation, and *solid* in its nature, and which we must by no means treat with indifference or contempt; the divine wisdom has established *this* as a *bond* of society, and one of the natural *rewards* of virtue.

EVAGORAS.

And in what, pray, does this glory consist, on which we are to place so high a value?

SOCRATES.

It consists in the approbation of the Wise, and the esteem of those among whom we live.
The point that is the most material here,
is

is not so much to have a *great* reputation, as to have a *good* one. The extent of our reputation depends upon that of the sphere in which we move, and upon the nature of that *part* that we are called to *act* upon the theatre of life: as our sphere is larger or more confined, as our part is more or less eminent and conspicuous, so, in proportion, must our glory be. It is not necessary to be universally known, but it is necessary to be known by virtuous actions, and by qualities that will shew us to the best advantage.

M I C R O P H I L U S.

I do not see clearly the justness of the distinction you make here; it appears to me that to seek after praise, or to pursue the esteem of others, is almost one and the same thing.

S O C R A T E S.

No, Microphilus, you mistake the matter; *praise* and *esteem* are very different.

DIALOGUE VI. 183

different things: THEMISTOCLES was ambitious of applause, he sought it from all, without distinction, and was quite indifferent from whom it came; but the conduct of THEMISTOCLES was often dubious, and gave room for suspicion. ARISTIDES was desirous of esteem, and it is certain that his virtue never degenerated, but was always the same.

EVAGORAS.

Let us then aim only at the glory of ARISTIDES; it is doubtless the best, and deserves the preference: but I would be glad to know why esteem is not always accompanied with applause?

SOCRATES.

This you shall see immediately: pray, tell me, Evagoras, do you applaud, in their presence, those whom you esteem most? do you praise such to their face?

EVAGORAS.

This I never durst venture to do,
from

174 D I A L O G U E VI.

from a fear of offending their modesty.

S O C R A T E S.

Do you praise them, even when they are absent, in pompous language?

E V A G O R A S.

No, Socrates, the esteem we have for the Wise and Good expresses itself in more moderate terms. We think it sufficient to speak of them advantageously upon every occasion, and to render them service when an opportunity is offered. These marks of esteem, which make no noise, and are generally indirect, are much more valuable, and undoubtedly more sincere, than the highest encomiums, and the most pompous panegyrics.

S O C R A T E S.

You are perfectly in the right; the esteem which you thus describe, is really precious, and may be placed with justice among the greatest blessings of human life.

M I C R O -

DIALOGUE VI 185

MICROPHILUS.

For what reason, Socrates?

SOCRATES.

Has not nature connected a pleasing sensation, an agreeable *feeling* of satisfaction and joy, to whatever tends to discover to us, in ourselves, any amiable quality, any real perfection?

EVAGORAS.

No doubt, Socrates: we are much pleased with the view of excellent qualities in ourselves; and this really is a natural allurements to engage us in their pursuit.

SOCRATES.

If a person respectable for his wisdom should censure your conduct, what effect would this produce in your mind?

EVAGORAS.

Ah! Socrates, I should be covered with shame, were I so unhappy as to have incurred your censure; your disappro-

approbation would fill me with intollerable confusion and anguish.

SOCRATES.

If, on the contrary, any venerable and wise man should testify to you his approbation of your character, what feelings would this excite ?

EVAGORAS.

A feeling of inward contentment and joy, delicious beyond expression. Your goodness, Socrates, has sometimes administered to me the sweet experience of this noble pleasure.

SOCRATES.

Would you enjoy the same pleasure in the approbation of a person in whom you had no confidence ?

EVAGORAS.

No, Socrates, such a testimony as yours can only convince me that I am really possessed of such and such perfections, of this or the other good quality : the testimony of persons less capable

DIALOGUE VI. 187

ble of judging, and less sincere in their declarations, would not give me the same persuasion of my merit, or render me, by far, so satisfied with myself.

SOCRATES.

You will then, no doubt, approve of that common maxim, that we should be indifferent about the *praises* of all, but those who are themselves *praiseworthy*.

EVAGORAS.

I find this saying a most excellent one, and by this I perceive that true honour and real glory arise from the esteem of the virtuous and the wise.

SOCRATES.

But the esteem of others is not only productive of a high degree of inward pleasure, and heart-felt satisfaction, but is also a source of numberless advantages through the whole course and conduct of life.

MICRO-

MICROPHILUS.
And pray, Socrates, what are these advantages?

SOCRATES.
You will easily perceive them without my assistance. Pray, is it not of use to a Merchant to have good *credit*?

MICROPHILUS.
Beyond all doubt, for the *credit* of a Merchant may be justly considered as the half of his riches.

SOCRATES.
And do you think he will have *credit*, if he passes in the opinion of others for a person that is unskilful in his business, and dishonest in his dealings?

MICROPHILUS.
No surely: his *credit* must arise from the good opinion that is generally entertained of his prudence, and integrity.

SOCRATES.
The *credit*, then, he has, and the confidence that is placed in him, are properly

perly nothing else but the *esteem* of others,

MICROPHILUS.

This is evident.

SOCRATES.

Again, can we rise to honorable employments, or advance ourselves in the world, without the assistance of others?

MICROPHILUS.

No; our prospect here must depend upon the protection of superiors, or on the favour of the people.

SOCRATES.

Is it then a matter of indifference in this case, whether we have a good, or a bad reputation?

MICROPHILUS.

I have often heard that a good reputation clears the way to preferment; and yet we have seen many persons, that were but little esteemed, rise to honours by artifice and intrigue; ALCIBIADES may serve as an example of this.

SOCRATES.

ALCIBIADES was a mixture of shining
quali-

190 D I A L O G U E VI.

qualities and great defects. It is possible that men may sometimes rise to preferment by unworthy means; but if you ask me, what is the direct road, the surest path to honours and advancement, I answer, that it can be only conspicuous merit, and a good reputation.

M I C R O P H I L U S.

I perceive indeed that the *esteem* of others is an essential step to honours and preferment; but, surely, this is by no means so necessary to those, who, void of ambition, seek nothing farther than the ease and tranquillity of a private condition.

E V A G O R A S.

Pray, allow me, Socrates, to set my friend right in this matter, and also to use, for this purpose, your method of arriving at the truth. Tell me, Microphilus, why you were so nettled the other day at my jokes? they seemed to touch you to the very quick.

M I C R O -

DIALOGUE VI. 191

MICROPHILUS.

A fine question indeed! why, because nothing is more disagreeable, than to be turned into ridicule, and particularly, Evagoras, by a friend, like you.

EVAGORAS.

And what would you say, if I reproached you with what I heard about a month ago, in a large company, where you were accused of cowardice?

MICROPHILUS.

I accused of cowardice? where did I ever betray a want of courage? who are they that dare

EVAGORAS.

Softly, my good friend, you forget yourself; what are such accusations to you? You have only to despise them, as matters of no significancy or importance.

MICROPHILUS.

No; those persons have injured me, and I am determined to have satisfaction.

on. I shall make them feel the weight of my resentment.

SOCRATES.

Calm your passion, Microphilus; all this is but a *feint* of Evagoras, an innocent artifice, designed to convince you from your own feelings, that we cannot be indifferent to the reproach, or to the esteem of others; but that their judgment, on the contrary, will always touch us in some point or other. The divine Wisdom, which formed us for society, has implanted in us a reciprocal regard to each other's good opinion, that by this sort of mutual dependance we might be more closely, and intimately united together.

MICROPHILUS.

And is this the case in every state and condition of life?

SOCRATES.

Undoubtedly it is: we have already observed that every one, in his own sphere,

sphere, has necessary connections with a certain number of persons, and this number is not fixed to any limits; for not a day arrives, but we may have to do with such as we have never seen before.

MICROPHILUS.

This is true.

SOCRATES.

The generous probity, the civility, and complaisance, that others observe in their conduct to us, depend, in a great measure, upon the esteem they have for our characters, and the attachment that arises from hence to our persons. Do you imagine, for example, that a man who is neither esteemed by his *wife, children, nor domestics*, will be loved, honoured, or served as he should be? Will he find in them the same attention to gratify his desires, and the same disposition to respect his orders, that such will experience whose desires

K

and

and orders are reasonable and just? Will they be afraid to displease him? Will his presence afford them pleasure or satisfaction? Will his afflictions excite their sympathy? Will they ever feel anxious apprehensions of losing him, as they certainly would, were he the object of their *esteem*?

M I C R O P H I L U S.

But will not *natural affection*, and a sense of *duty* produce the same effects that arise from *esteem*?

S O C R A T E S.

To give *duty* its proper influence and weight, we must be animated to the performance of it by such motives as *touch* the heart: and you seem to have been sensible of this, Microphilus, when you mentioned the motive of *natural affection*. But such *affection* must be founded on, or, at least, supported by *esteem*; it is absolutely incompatible with indifference or contempt. A *wife* who
finds

finds her *husband* truly despicable, will scarcely be induced to give him a share in her affections; *children* that are spectators of the irregularities of a *father* will respect him but by halves; *servants* that have found his weak side, will lie in wait to deceive him, so that, while he thinks himself their *master*, he is nothing more, than their *dupe*; and his *neighbours* and *relations*, who are sensible of his faults, will look down upon him with contempt. And what is there more shocking, than to find, wherever we go, looks of coldness, and indifference; and reading, in the countenances of such as approach us, their inward sentiments, to perceive clearly that they despise us? This, in reality, is a deep mortification.

E V A G O R A S.

On the other hand, it must furnish matter of delightful reflection in our minds, to see every where around us

196 D I A L O G U E VI.

persons that are attached to us by real affection, and disposed to serve us from respect and esteem. If the approbation of the meanest slave is not a matter of indifference to us, how high must be that pleasure, that arises from a persuasion that we stand well in the good opinion of all those with whom we live?

M I C R O P H I L U S.

Notwithstanding all this, we see every day *friendships* formed, where real *esteem* has no part.

S O C R A T E S.

These are connections, that are founded upon *pleasure*, or cemented by *interest*, but they are far from being of a durable or permanent nature. As to connections of interest, they are immediately broken when the advantages cease, or the circumstances change, on which they were founded. Equally transitory is the union that is contracted
only

only for the purposes of pleasure and sensuality: persons of a vicious character may, for some time, contribute to our amusement; we may divert ourselves in their company; but, at bottom, we despise them, and when the season of folly is over, they generally become the objects of our hatred. On the contrary, the society of those whom we respect and esteem is a permanent source of pleasure and satisfaction; it is to those that we have recourse for direction and counsel, and in them that we confide in the most important concerns of life. This mutual *esteem*, as it is the only foundation of that trust and confidence that are necessary to the existence of domestic happiness, so is it also the only *basis* of true *friendship*, and its surest support.

EVAGORAS.

And by what means is the esteem, which you speak of, to be acquired?

K 3

SOCRA-

S O C R A T E S.

By our *talents*, and by our *virtue*; these have such a manifest and undoubted right to the *esteem* of mankind, that it is not in the power, even of the Vicious and Abandoned, to behold them without respect and inward veneration.

E V A G O R A S.

But will not the appearance of *talents* and *virtue* produce here the same effects that you attribute to the real possession of them?

S O C R A T E S.

Not at all, Evagoras. To counterfeit the man of parts, and deceive the world by the appearance of virtue, is a task too difficult to be carried on with success, and will prove in the issue to be useless labour; the public will not be long imposed upon, for the cheat must soon be detected. The shortest way to arrive at our *end* here, is to *be* in reality *what* we would desire to *appear* in the eyes

eyes of mankind. In order to this there are certain qualities indispensably necessary, such as, *integrity, good morals, application, and judgment*: but these must also be attended with other qualities that are engaging, and attractive, such as *good-nature, complaisance, and a general and uniform politeness of manners*. Remember, Evagoras, our former conversation, upon that which constitutes the *merit* of Man in general, and the *merit* of each particular station and profession in life; call to mind also the rules we laid down, the other day, for the direction of our conduct towards the various ranks to which we stand related in society, whether as our *superiors, inferiors, or equals*. From hence, if I don't mistake, you will come to the knowledge of those means that are requisite to gain the approbation of the Wise, and to deserve the esteem of the Public.

EVAGORAS.

I should think that the *public esteem* is, in a peculiar manner, necessary to Princes, since they by their station are persons that sustain a public character.

SOCRATES.

You are in the right, Evagoras, and it is precisely towards *this* that they should bend their course, instead of pursuing that idle phantom of *vain-glory*, that engrosses their attention, and fills their heads with such extravagant notions.

MICROPHILUS.

Metinks, however, that a Prince is above the judgments that the people may form of his character and conduct.

SOCRATES.

He is much less so than any other person, however private his condition may be; the Prince is more dependent
on

DIALOGUE VI. 201

on the People, than the People are on the Prince.

MICROPHILUS.

How can that be, Socrates? I am surprized at your discourse.

SOCRATES.

You will see this clearly by a familiar example. Of the stones that compose an *arch*, or *vault*, which is the one that stands most in need of support from the others?

MICROPHILUS.

It is undoubtedly that which is at the top of the building, and which we commonly call the *key-stone*; for, unsupported by the others, it must fall to the ground; while those, that are so low as to touch the earth, maintain their place, independent of the rest.

SOCRATES.

But would the other stones form a vault without the *key*?

MICROPHILUS.

No, surely; it is the *key-stone* that joins

K 5

and

202 D I A L O G U E VI.

and unites the rest, and by that means forms and completes the building.

S O C R A T E S.

Let us then apply this to the matter in question; *civil society* resembles a *vault* that is finished with art, where every *family*, like the different stones, enters into the composition of the edifice, and occupies some place, whether it be higher or lower. The *King* is at the head, to unite and maintain together the several parts of the building; but he himself is supported, and sustained by his People: he stands in constant and perpetual need of the concurrence of their hands and their hearts in his service.

M I C R O P H I L U S.

True; but these hands and these hearts are engaged in his service, and concur to his views, from a principle of *submission*, and from the dictates of *obedience*. Princes are obeyed, because they are
Princes,

Princes, and on account of their *authority*.

SOCRATES.

There is an *external* kind of *authority* that is vested in them by the laws: but there is an authority of another nature, which must be added to this, and without which it is neither solid nor sure.

EVAGORAS.

And pray what is this?

SOCRATES.

To give it a name, let us call it, if you please, *internal authority*. It consists in that natural ascendant that men acquire over others by superior degrees of capacity and merit. Whence did ORPHEUS derive that influence, that crowned with success his attempts to civilize the people of THRACE, tho' destitute of power and external authority? it was from his being regarded by that People as the wisest among men. It was in consequence of this that his counsels

K 6

were

were respected as laws, and that his example was set up as a model. But change the scene, and see what a wretched figure those Monarchs make, with all their pomp, and all their power, who are unsupported by the affection and *esteem* of the Public?

E V A G O R A S.

History, indeed, is fertile in examples of this latter kind.

S O C R A T E S.

The examples, alas! are too numerous; you see them in each page; and this is the source of their own misfortunes, as well as of the miseries of those unhappy nations that are subjected to their government. A Prince, whose character is unworthy of *esteem*, is, even in his capacity as a man deprived by this of numberless comforts that arise from friendship and mutual confidence, which constitute the happiness and the security of life. But in his higher cha-
racter

racter as a Ruler and a Sovereign, the contempt that pursues him is yet more fatal; by this, his authority totters and is degraded; foreign Princes withdraw from him their trust, or neglect his alliance; and he loses the affection of his ministers, the respect of his courtiers, and the hearts of his subjects. Is he attacked by the bitterness of raillery and satire? all is believed that is laid to his charge, and he is thought capable of whatever is imputed to him. Are his weaknesses discovered, and his evil inclinations found out? immediately the Artful and Designing lie in wait to abuse his simplicity, and to take advantage of his humours to accomplish their views. He is obeyed with reluctance, he is served without zeal, he is surrounded with persons of suspicious characters, and with such as are every moment disposed to betray him. In a word, a Prince who is thus low in the
 public

public *esteem* is destitute of every real comfort, and of every solid support; and all things about him are in confusion and disorder. When misfortunes and adversity break in upon his grandeur, the Vulgar who behold them, look no farther than the apparent cause that immediately precedes them; but the eye of the Wise, that pierces deeper into things, perceives a long train of *causes* that have contributed to the present *catastrophe*: it sees a *tree* whose roots have been gradually *withering*, and *corrupting*; and is not surprized that, with such a weak foundation, it is at length overthrown, and demolished by a blast of wind.

E V A G O R A S.

It would not be difficult to form a *portrait*, that should represent the reverse of all this.

S O C R A T E S.

I leave that to you, Evagoras; your
judg-

judgment and eloquence will furnish you with the *lines* that are proper to compose it; and it will come from you with an uncommon advantage, and a peculiar grace.

E V A G O R A S.

I shall attempt it then; since this is your desire. “ The Sovereign, that
 “ knows how to blend with the dignity
 “ of his eminent rank the engaging
 “ charms of that *wisdom, integrity, and*
 “ *goodness* that are so naturally adapted
 “ to gain hearts, will be honoured and
 “ loved by his People, as a tender
 “ father is cherished in his family; he
 “ will be obeyed from inclination,
 “ through a persuasion that his com-
 “ mands are equitable and just, and
 “ that his Ministers are chosen with
 “ wisdom and discernment. The pub-
 “ lic taxes will be furnished without
 “ reluctance, as his subjects are con-
 “ vinced that they are imposed with
 dis-

208 D I A L O G U E VI.

“ discretion, and applied to good pur-
 “ poses. Each individual will implore
 “ the blessings of Heaven upon his
 “ reign, and send up their fervent and
 “ devout petitions for the length of his
 “ days; the Princes round about him
 “ will fear to draw dishonour upon
 “ themselves by offending him, and if
 “ it so happens that he is attacked by
 “ any one, he will be undoubtedly
 “ supported, and defended by the rest.
 “ A Prince, whose person and charac-
 “ ter are esteemed, will be always su-
 “ perior in power to others, because he
 “ will have more friends than they,
 “ and, at the same time, fewer ene-
 “ mies.

S O C R A T E S.

I should have been in the wrong,
 Evagoras, not to have charged you with
 the composition of this *portrait*, since you
 have succeeded so perfectly, and *finished*
 it with such noble and masterly *strokes*.

M I C R O -

MICROPHILUS.

But, perhaps, it will be found that the advantages arising from the *public esteem* to the support of Princes, and the maintenance of their *authority*, hold good only in the cases of *elective Sovereigns*, where the Prince must make his way to the throne by the *voices* of the nation.

SOCRATES.

If an *hereditary Prince* does not depend upon the voice of the Nation to raise him to *Empire*, he nevertheless stands constantly in need of it to render his government *solid*, and his administration a *source* of happiness and glory. These signal advantages arise from an happy agreement between the *will* of the Prince and the *desires* of the People, and from their unanimous concurrence in those measures that have the public good for their object. But, besides, to form a right judgment in this matter, we should always keep in view the
great

210 D I A L O G U E VI.

great *end* of Government, and the primitive institution of *Monarchy*.

EVAGORAS.

I would be glad to have this explained more fully.

SOCRATES.

The first *Monarchies* were *elective*, and this was certainly the best *form* of government as long as men continued moderate and wise, for then their choice distinguished true *merit*, and raised to the throne such as were most conspicuous by their *capacity* and *experience*. But ambition made perpetual inroads upon this fair order, that would have sprung from *liberty*, when directed by *wisdom*; cabals and intrigues were employed to obtain the suffrages of the People, and hence proceeded these civil wars and dissensions, that induced most nations rather to run the hazard of those evils that attend *hereditary Monarchy*, than to purchase a King of their own chusing,
at

DIALOGUE VI. 211

at so dear a rate. The Wife, however, endeavoured at the same time to find a remedy for the inconveniencies of this dangerous institution.

MICROPHILUS.

And how, Socrates?

SOCRATES.

By the care they took to educate in the best manner the children of their Monarchs, and to remove from their view whatever might tend to corrupt their principles. By this precaution they did all, that was possible, to secure a *succession* of *hereditary Princes* who should be as capable, and as worthy of *Empire*, as if they had been expressly *elected* for that purpose: and when such precautions are attended with success, they happily unite the advantages that are peculiar to the two different *forms* of government of which we have been speaking; they answer the *end* of *elective* government, by providing the
Nation

Nation with a wise Prince ; while it is delivered from the horrors of *civil discord*, which are prevented by the establishment of a *Lineal Succession*.

E V A G O R A S.

As you have now stated the matter, Socrates, I fully perceive how unworthy it would be of a true Prince, to think himself dispensed by the *rights* of his birth from the acquisition of those *virtues* that would have been necessary to entitle him to an *Elective Monarchy*. The first of his ancestors that possessed the throne was certainly raised to it by *merit*; and the People that chose him had a right to expect that his successors would renew the example of his virtues, and fill his place in every respect. The same degree of elevation will always require the same degree of merit; and the least that a Prince owes to a Nation that has rendered the *sceptre hereditary* in his family, is, to conduct himself in
such

DIALOGUE VI. 213

such a manner, as that the People may never have reason to repent of what they have done. How glorious is it to draw from the whole body of a People this chearful confession, “ that if they were
“ to chuse a Sovereign, their suffrages
“ would unite in that Prince only whom
“ the *order of succession* has appointed
“ to be their ruler? ”

S O C R A T E S.

This indeed constitutes the dignity, and the character of the *true Prince*. I must embrace you, my dear Evagoras, before we part, so much am I delighted, to find you possessed of such noble sentiments.

THE END.



BOOKS printed for A. MILLAR.

F O L I O.

JAC. AUGUSTI THUANI HISTORIA SUI TEMPORIS. Edita per S. Buckley. In 7 vols. Price SEVEN Guineas a Sett, bound.

2. A New and Complete Collection of the Works of the Hon. ROBERT BOYLE. To the Whole is prefixed, *A New Account of his Life*, consisting partly of Memoirs drawn up by himself. In 5 vols.

3. The Works of FRANCIS BACON, Lord High Chancellor of England. With several *Additional Pieces*, never before printed in any Edition of his Works. To which is prefixed, *A New Life of the Author*. By Mr Mallet. In 3 vols.

N. B. The *Additional Pieces* and *Life* may be had alone, to complete the Edition of 1750.

4. The OCEANA and Other Works of JAMES HARRINGTON, Esq; Collected, Methodized, and Reviewed; with an exact Account of his Life prefixed, by John Toland. To which is added, An APPENDIX, containing all the Political Tracts wrote by this Author, omitted in Mr. Toland's Edition. The Third Edition. To which is now added an Index.

N. B. The *Appendix* may be had alone, to complete those Gentlemen's Books, who have bought Mr. Toland's Edition.

5. An Historical and Political Discourse of the Laws and Government of *England*, from the *First Times* to the End of the Reign of Queen *Elizabeth*. With a Vindication of the Ancient Way of Parliaments in England. Collected from some Manuscript Notes of JOHN SELDEN, Esq; by Nathaniel Bacon, Esq; The Fourth Edition. Corrected and improved by a Gentleman of the *Middle-Temple*.

6. The Works of EDMUND LUDLOW, Esq; Lieutenant-General of the Horse, Commander in Chief of the Forces in *Ireland*, One of the Council
of

BOOKS printed for A. MILLAR.

of State, and a Member of the Parliament, which began Nov. 3. 1640. Containing his MEMOIRS and other TRACTS, now collected into One Vol. To which is prefixed the Life of the Author, by the Editor.

7. Discourses concerning Government, by ALGERNON SIDNEY. To which is added, Some Letters of Mr. Sidney's, never before published, and a Life of the Author, by Thomas Birch, A.M. and F. R. S. With a copious Index.

N. B. There are a few of the above seven Books printed on a superfine Writing-paper.

8. A Complete Collection of the *Historical, Political, and Miscellaneous Works* of JOHN MILTON: Correctly printed from the *Original Editions*. Containing several *Original Papers* of His, never before published. With an Historical and Critical Account of the Life and Writings of the Author. By T. Birch, M. A. and F. R. S. In 2 vols. Royal Paper, Quarto.

9. All the Works of JOHN LOCKE, Esq; With Alphabetical Tables. The Fifth Edition. In 3 vols.

10. The Works of the Most Rev. Dr. JOHN TILLOTSON, Lord Archbishop of Canterbury. In Three Volumes. To this Edition is first prefixed, *The Life of the Author*, compiled chiefly from his Original Papers and Letters. By Thomas Birch, D. D.

11. CYCLOPEDIA: or, An Universal Dictionary of Arts and Sciences. By E. Chambers, F. R. S. In 2 vols.

12. A Supplement to Mr. Chambers's CYCLOPEDIA. In 2 vols.

13. The Works of THOMSON. In 3 vols. Octavo, with Cuts. *Discreet* Four Volumes Twelves. To both which are added, Some POEMS never before printed. His *Seasons*. In a Pocket Edition, and most of his Pieces separate.

to
re
ft